Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon: Preserving the  Critical Link  Between Habitat Modification and the  Taking  of an Endangered Species by Plante, Kenneth J. & Baumann, Andrew J.
Nova Law Review
Volume 20, Issue 2 1996 Article 8
Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon: Preserving
the “Critical Link” Between Habitat
Modification and the ”Taking” of an
Endangered Species
Kenneth J. Plante∗ Andrew J. Baumann†
∗
†
Copyright c©1996 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon: Preserving the "Critical Link" Between
Habitat Modification and the "Taking" of an Endangered
Species
Kenneth J. Plante* and Andrew J. Baumann**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................. 748
I1. PROHIBITING THE "TAKE" OF AN ENDANGERED SPECIES
UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE ACT .................... 750
III. FROM PALIA TO SWEET HOME-RECOGNIZING THE
CRITICAL LINK BETWEEN HABITAT DESTRUCTION AND
"HARM" ....................................... 753
A. The Early Cases-Froehlke, Coleman, and Hill .... 753
B. Section 9 is Linked to Habitat Destruction-Palila. 758
C. The Federal Government Reacts-The Attempted
Dilution of Palila and the Redefinition of Harm .... 764
D. Congress Reacts-Genesis of the "Incidental
Taking" Exception ........................ 766
E. Palila II-Identifying the "Critical Link Between
Habitat Modification and Injury to the Species" . 769
F. Post Paila 11-Meeting the "Critical Link"
Requirement ............................ 774
* General Counsel, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Tallahassee,
Florida; former General Counsel, Florida Department of Natural Resources, Tallahassee,
Florida. B.A., 1970, Cornell University; J.D., 1984, Florida State University; M.S., 1977
Florida State University; M.A., 1976, Florida State University. Mr. Plante is a member of
the Florida Bar Land Use and Environmental Law Section and the Florida Bar Administrative
Law Section.
** Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Environmental Protection,
Tallahassee, Florida. B.A., Dean's List of Scholars for the academic years of 1990-91 and
1991-92, 1992, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida; J.D., cum laude, 1995, Tulane
University School of Law.
The authors would like to thank M.B. Adelson IV, Assistant General Counsel, Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, for his substantial contribution to the analysis and
drafting of this article.
1
Plante and Baumann: Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon: P
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
G. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon v. Lujan-Raising a Direct Challenge to
Palila in the District Court .................. 775
H. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon v. Babbit-The Tortuous Journey Through
the Circuit Court ......................... 786
I. The Circuits Split-Harsh Reactions to Sweet Home
in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ........... 800
IV. THE SUPREME COURT STEPS IN-BABBIT V. SWEET HOME
CHAPTER OF COMMUNITIES FOR A GREAT OREGON ...... .. 801
A. The Secretary's Interpretation is Supported
by the Ordinary Usage of the Word "Hann" ....... 802
B. The Broad Purpose of the ESA Supports the
Reasonableness of the Secretary's Interpretation
of "Harm" .. ............................. 805
C. The 1982 Amendments to the ESA Support the
Reasonableness of the Secretary's Interpretation ... 807
D. Flaws in the Appellate Court's Opinion ......... 809
E. Addressing the Chapter's Other Arguments ....... 811
F. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence .............. 813
G. Justice Scalia's Dissent ..................... 819
V. CONCLUSION ................................ 829
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973' makes it
unlawful for any person to "take" an endangered or threatened species of
wildlife.2 Since its adoption, the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") has
embroiled judges, environmentalists, and the development community in
bitter controversy. Industry and development interests have continually
attacked the ESA, charging that it favors plants and animals over jobs and
people. Environmentalists and conservationists embrace the Act as the last
1. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16 U.S.C.).
2. Id. § 9(a)(1), 87 Stat. at 893 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994)).
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hope for a significant number of species pushed to the brink of extinction
by the adverse activities of mankind.3
Nowhere in the ESA has the legal battle been more critically focused
than in section 9 and what it means to "take" an endangered species. As
analytically discussed in this article, the term "take" clearly encompasses the
actual killing, injury, collection, or capture of an individual member of a
protected species through the direct application of physical force.4 These,
however, are the limits that the development and land use community has
been willing to concede are section 9's prohibitions. Conservationists and
others opposed to some particular human impacts, on the other hand, have
sought to extend section 9's protections to encompass activities that, while
not resulting in the direct or immediate application of physical force to the
animal, nevertheless results in harm, injury, or death through the adverse
modification, degradation or destruction of habitat. This is where the
agreement that has existed dissolves and where the hard-fought battle has
been waged in earnest. In the summer of 1995, a case dispositive of the
definition of "harm" as used in section 9's prohibition against "taking" an
endangered species was decided.
On June 29, 1995, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
long awaited decision in Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities For
A Great Oregon (Sweet Home V). 5 The decision is significant in several
contemporary respects. First, in Sweet Home V, the Court has apparently
concluded, by a 6-3 majority, a colloquial dispute that has persisted for over
two decades regarding the proper scope of section 9's protections. Second,
the decision was rendered at a time when the ESA was under increasingly
vigorous attack from political, legislative, and popular interests; at a time
3. In promulgating the ESA, Congress recognized the serious nature of the rising number
of plant and animal extinctions worldwide:
It has become increasingly apparent that some sort of protective measures
must be taken to prevent the further extinction of many of the world's animal
species. The number of animals on the Secretary of Interior's list of domestic
species that are currently threatened with extinction is now 109. On the foreign
list there are over 300 species. Further, the rate of extinction has increased to
where on the average, one species disappears per year.
S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990.
This so-called "Extinction Crises" is more fully discussed in DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr, A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 7-17
(1989).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 3(14), 87 Stat. at 885 (1978) (redesignated as § 3(19) by Pub.
L. No. 95-632, § 2, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752 (1978); current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)
(1994)).
5. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
1996]
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when the ESA's future was, and indeed remains, uncertain. Thus, Sweet
Home V arguably signals an emerging view in the federal courts calling for
a logical, common sense construction of our nation's environmental laws.
This article examines the existing regulatory scheme associated with
section 9 of the ESA as it developed and exists before and after Sweet Home
V. The dispute over the incorporation of significant habitat protection under
this section is summarized, and this article culminates with a detailed
analysis of the Sweet Home V opinion itself. The effects of the Sweet Home
V opinion upon section 9, as well as other provisions of the ESA, are
examined, and conclusions are drawn regarding the long-term impact of this
case.
II. PROHIBITING THE "TAKE" OF AN ENDANGERED SPECIES UNDER
SECTION 9 OF THE ACT
Section 9(a)(1)(B) of the ESA forbids conduct by any person that will
"take" a species protected under the Act:
(1) Except as provided in sections 6(g)(2) and 10 of this title, with
respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to
section 4 of this title it is unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to:
(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea
of the United States ....
This prohibition differs from other major provisions of the ESA in
several particular respects. Initially, section 9 distinguishes between those
species which are endangered7 and those which are threatened.8 By its
6. Pub L. No. 93-205, § 9(a)(1)(B), 87 Stat. at 893 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1538(a)(1)(B).
7. The term "endangered species" is defined by the Act to mean:
any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the
Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of this
chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.
Id. § 3(4), 87 Stat. at 885 (redesignated as § 3(6) by Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 2, 92 Stat. at
3751; current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6)).
8. The Act also defines "threatened species" as "any species which is likely to become
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion
of its range." Id. § 3(15), 87 Stat. at 835 (redesignated as § 3(20) by Pub. L. No. 95-632,
§ 2, 92 Stat. at 3752; current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20)).
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very terms, the statute applies "with respect to any endangered species of
fish or wildlife . . ."' "throughout all or a significant portion of its
range."10  Thus, only those species qualifying for endangered status are
expressly included under section 9. By contrast, those species listed as
threatened enjoy section 9 protection only by virtue of regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary")." Even then, extension
of section 9 protection to threatened species does not appear to be a
mandatory obligation imposed upon the Secretary. 2 Instead, section
9(a)(1) protection is provided at the discretion of the Secretary who must
deem such action to be "necessary and advisable."' 3
Unlike other provisions of the ESA which apply to federal agencies,
section 9 prohibits acts by "any person." Section 3, in turn, defines
"person" very broadly, including individuals, business entities, and all levels
9. Id. § 9, 87 Stat. at 893 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)) (emphasis added);
see also ROHLF, supra note 3, at 59, 73. This language also excludes plants from § 9
protection. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 9, 87 Stat. at 893 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1538(a)(1)).
10. Id. § 3(4), (15), 87 Stat. at 885.
11. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.31-.48 (1994). In this regulation, the Secretary, with a few noted
exceptions, declares that the provisions and protections (including the prohibition against
"taking" under § 9) found in § 17.21 for endangered species, shall now be applicable for
species listed as threatened under the Act. These regulations are issued pursuant to
regulatory power identified under § 4(d) of the ESA:
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species pursuant to subsection (c)
of this section, the Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary
and advisable to provide for the conservation of such species. The Secretary
may by regulation prohibit with respect to any threatened species any act
prohibited under section 9(a)(1) of this title ....
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 4, 87 Stat. at 888 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994))
(emphasis added).
12. ROHLF, supra note 3, at 74-75. The issue of whether the Secretary must prevent the
taking of a threatened species has not been directly litigated. I&
13. For a more thorough discussion of this issue see ROHLF, supra note 3, at 73-75. It
should be noted that § 4(d) of the ESA which grants the Secretary this regulatory power does
seem to provide a significant degree of discretion. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 4, 87 Stat. at 886
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d)). Note that the Secretary must issue regulations for
threatened species only upon deeming such action to be "necessary and advisable to provide
for the conservation of such species." Id. Therefore, the Secretary must make some kind
of finding as to the necessity of such regulations for that species' conservation. Additionally,
§ 4(d) provides that "[t]he Secretary may by regulation" prohibit a taking under § 9(a)(1).
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of government within the reach of section 9.14 The scope of this regulation
is far more extensive and encompasses every conceivable actor down to the
individual.15
Section 9 of the ESA defines the term "take" as "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct."'16 This definition clearly contemplates the
more traditionally understood activities that "take" wildlife by hunting,
killing, and collecting of individual animals. But in defining the ESA's true
intent and scope around the "take" concept (within the purposes of the ESA)
the focus has been on the terms "harm" and "harass." The term "harm" has
been defined in regulations promulgated by the Department: "Harm in the
definition of take in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degrada-
tion where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."' 7
Similarly, the Department has defined "harass" as used in section 9:
Harass in the definition of "take" in the Act means an intentional or
negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to
wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt
normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to,
breeding, feeding and sheltering. 8
Substantial controversy has been fomented over the use of these two terms
by the Department of Interior as well as by the courts. 9 The salient issue
14. Section 3(13) of the ESA defines "person" to include:
[A]n individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other private
entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a
State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipality, or political
sub4ivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.
Pub. L. No. 100-478, § 1001(a)(13), 102 Stat. 2306 (1988) (original version at Pub. L. No.
95-205, § 3(8), 87 Stat. at 885; current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13)).
15. See ROHLF, supra note 3, at 73-75.
16. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 3, 87 Stat. at 885 (redesignated as § 3(19) by Pub. L. No. 95-
632, § 2(7), 92 Stat. at 3751; current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)).
17. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. See generally Federico Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against Takings
in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a Powerful
Species Preservation Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109 (1991).
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was always: can a person "take" an endangered species by altering or
destroying its habitat?
Ill. FROM PALLA TO SWEET HOME-RECOGNIZING THE CRITICAL
LINK BETWEEN HABITAT DESTRUCTION AND "HARM"
From its origin, the ESA was intently focused on habitat preserva-
tion.2" Congress identified the two most significant causes of species
extinction as habitat loss and hunting.2 ' Given the ESA's clear focus on
habitat, it seemed logical, and Congress understood, that a species could be
"taken" through the destruction of its habitat. Yet this link between habitat
loss and the "taking" of an endangered species was frequently litigated and
initially eluded the courts.
A. The Early Cases---Froehlke, Coleman, and Hill
In Sierra Club v. Froehlk , the Sierra Club initiated a lawsuit to halt
the construction of Missouri's Meramec Park Dam and Reservoir.'
Brought under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),z Sierra
20. The legislative history underlying the ESA acknowledged habitat loss as "the major
cause for the extinction of species worldwide." H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9455. During the floor debates on the 1973
House draft of the ESA, Representative Sullivan proclaimed that:
For the most part, the principal threat to animals stems from the destruction
of their habitat. The destruction may be intentional, as would be the case in
clearing of fields and forests for development or resource extraction, or it may
be unintentional, as in the case of the spread of pesticides beyond their target
area. Whether it is intentional or not, however, the result is unfortunate for the
species of animals that depend on that habitat, most of whom are already living
on the edge of survival.
119 CoNG. REC. H30,162 (1973). This overriding concern for habitat is reflected in
Congress' declaration of purpose found in § 2 of the ESA:
The purposes of this Act are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the
purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(b), 87 Stat. at 885 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994)).
The primacy of habitat protection in the scheme of the ESA is more fully discussed in
Katherine S. Yagerman, Protecting Critical Habitat Under the Federal Endangered Species
Act, 20 ENVT. L. 811, 827-47 (1990).
21. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, at 1, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2990.
22. 392 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1996]
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Club's complaint was amended, adding a claim under section 7(a)(2) of the
then newly-enacted ESA.24 The Sierra Club asserted that completion of the
reservoir would flood a series of subterranean caverns which were home to
the endangered Indiana bat, thereby violating the ESA because this flooding
would jeopardize the continued existence of this listed species.25
The district court was not persuaded by the Sierra Club's arguments.
Pointing to a dearth of knowledge concerning the bat, the court concluded
that the project did not violate section 7 of the Act.26 Section 9 was not
even addressed in the district court ruling which allowed the development
to proceed. 27
On appeal, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals examined Sierra Club's
ESA claims under both section 7 and section 9 of the ESA,28 upholding the
lower court's dismissal of the section 7 claim. 29 The court also rejected
Sierra Club's section 9 claim noting that the section 9 claim rested upon
Sierra Club's assertion that the dam's construction was an attempt to harm
the bat.3" The Froehlke opinion tied section 9 claims to a scienter
24. Sierra Club, 392 F. Supp. at 143.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 144. While not the focus of this article, § 7(a)(2) remains the centerpiece of
endangered species preservation efforts. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA provides in relevant part:
Each federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary [of the Interior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried
out by such agency.., is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary,
after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical ....
Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1225, 1226 (1979) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(2) (1994)). For a thorough analysis of § 7(a)(2) and the issues surrounding its
implementation, see Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation
by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993). For
a more focused discussion of the "critical habitat" provision of § 7, see Yagerman, supra
note 20; see also James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the
Endangered Species Act, 14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 311 (1990).
27. See Cheever, supra note 19, at 130 n.132 (pointing out that at the conclusion of the
district court stage of the Froehlke litigation, the Service had not yet adopted a regulation
defining "harass" as used defining a "taking").
28. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting claims
under both § 7 and § 9 of the ESA).
29. Id. at 1303-04.
30. Id. at 1304. In rejecting Sierra Club's § 9 claim, the Eighth Circuit found that:
The allegation as to violation of Section 9, as we have noted, rests upon
the asserted ground that the erection of the dam is a "clear attempt to harass or
harm" the Indiana bat. We are cited to no portion of the record so stating nor
[Vol. 20
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requirement somewhat akin to specific intent." Under Froehlke, a
violation of section 9 would be predicated by a specific intent to "harass"
or "harm" through the proposed activity. While this mental requirement is
easily established in the traditional context of a "taking" by hunting,
trapping, or collecting, this requirement would be insurmountable in cases
where the "taking" indirectly or allegedly resulted only from habitat
degradation. Development is rarely conducted with the specific goal of
harming a listed species. The Froehlke opinion illustrates an initial
reluctance by the federal courts to recognize incidental habitat protection as
being included within the concept of "taking" wildlife under section 9.
The continued vitality of this portion of the Froehlke opinion is in
doubt. Such a stringent intent requirement is inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the Act.32 A violation of section 9 requires only a showing of
general intent.3 A successful section 9(a)(1) cause of action need only
show that: 1) the defendant knowingly took an animal within the United
States; 2) the animal taken was actually an endangered or threatened species
protected under section 9(a)(1) of the ESA; and 3) that the defendant did not
have a permit from the Department of the Interior to "take" the animal.34
do we believe that from a fair reading thereof any such attempt may be found.
The purposes of the dam's construction have heretofore been discussed in some
detail and need not be elaborated upon at this point. An attempt to harass may
not reasonably be found therein. This Act, as any other, must have reasonable
construction.
Id.
31. Indeed, the Froehlke court required that the drowning of Indiana bats be a specific
goal of the project before it would find a "taking" under § 9. The court may have assumed
that the bats could simply relocate to avoid the rising water. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 392
F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975), afj'd, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976). Sierra Club apparently
offered no discussion or evidence of the availability or scarcity of other suitable caves. See
id.
32. The legislative history of the ESA contains plain congressional intent. Congress
expressed its desire that criminal violations of the ESA be general rather than specific intent
crimes. H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 20, at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9476.
33. United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988); United States
v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1987). In United States v. St. Onge, the
defendant, a hunter, mistook a protected grizzly bear for an elk. That he neither knew he
was shooting at a grizzly bear, nor intended any harm to the species, was no defense to a
prosecution for violating § 9. 676 F. Supp. at 1045. Similarly, in United States v. Billie, the
defendant was unsuccessful in his claim that the Government was required to prove that he
knew that the animal he was shooting at was an endangered Florida panther. 667 F. Supp.
at 1493.
34. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. at 1045.
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Harm to the species need not be a specific goal of the violator, only the
factual result of his activity.
National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman35 also dealt with the ESA
shortly after its adoption. Coleman focused exclusively on section 7.
Section 9 was not addressed in its holding.36 At issue was the proposed
extension of Interstate 10 through portions of Mississippi that would disturb
and destroy habitat vital to the Mississippi sandhill crane.37 The district
court concluded that the proposed Interstate 10 extension would not violate
ESA section 7(a)(2). 38 The National Wildlife Federation appealed to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and, in the interim, the Department of the
Interior designated the subject area as "critical habitat" of the sandhill
crane.3 9  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found this designation
compelling. The appellate court reversed the lower court, concluding that
the project violated section 7 and threatened the crane with extinction
because critical habitat would be lost, actually resulting in ultimate impacts
prohibited under the ESA.4 °
In 1979, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill,41 its first case directly involved with interpreting
the ESA. Faced with a multi-million dollar dam and reservoir project
which, upon completion, promised to eradicate the tiny snail darter, a
species of endangered fish,42 the Court concluded that it "would be hard
pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer" than
those found in the ESA.a3 Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA commanded federal
agencies to "insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them
do not jeopardize the continued existence" of an endangered species. 44
35. 400 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Miss. 1975), rev'd, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied sub nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
36. Id. at 711-12. The true significance of Coleman lies in the fact that § 7(a)(2) was
selected and used in the National Wildlife Federation's efforts to preserve sandhill crane
habitat, while § 9 was not. See Cheever, supra note 19, at 133-34.
37. Coleman, 407 F. Supp. at 707.
38. Id.
39. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
40. Id. at 374-75.
41. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
42. The Tennessee Valley Authority constructed the Tellico dam and reservoir on the
Little Tennessee River for the express purpose of generating electricity, providing recreation,
and encouraging shoreline development. The dam, once completed, would impound 16,500
acres of land, including the habitat of the tiny endangered snail darter fish. See id. at 156-58.
43. Id. at 173.
44. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. at 892 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1978)).
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Dam or no dam, the Hill Court concluded that ESA section 7 demanded
halting the project's completion to preserve the snail darter.45 Throughout
the Hill opinion, the Court noted the comprehensive nature of the protectio-
ns created for listed species under the Act, measuring the ESA's protective
mechanisms against the backdrop of strong congressional intent directed at
preserving the habitat of such species.46  While not directly concerning
section 9, the "take' provision did receive some attention by the Hill court:
We do not understand how TVA intends to operate Tellico Dam without
"harming" the snail darter. The Secretary of the Interior has defined the
term "harm" to mean "an act or omission which actually injures or kills
wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to signifi-
cantly disrupt essential behavior patterns, which include, but are not
limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering; significant environmental
modification or degradation which has such effects is included within
the meaning of 'harm.'47
These early cases illustrate the use of sections 9 and 7 to protect the
habitat of endangered species. Under Froehlke and Coleman, habitat
protection had arguably been assigned to section 7(a)(2), while section 9 was
interpreted according to the more traditional notions of "taking" by hunting,
trapping, and collecting. Even Hill, while recognizing section 9's habitat
protection functions, nevertheless focused most of its analysis on section 7.
However, a small bird in Hawaii would advance what a rare fish in
Tennessee had started.
45. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194. On the nature of Congress' stated intent, the Hill Court
observed that "Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that
the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities,
thereby adopting a policy which it described as 'institutionalized caution."' Id.
46. In reviewing the ESA, the court acknowledged the Act's strong emphasis on habitat:
The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in
the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute. All
persons, including federal agencies, are specifically instructed not to "take"
endangered species, meaning that no one is "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, capture, or collect" such life forms. Agencies in particular are [to]
... "use ... all methods and procedures which are necessary" to preserve
endangered species . . . . The pointed omission of the type of qualifying
language previously included in endangered species legislation reveals a
conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the
"primary missions" of federal agencies.
Id. at 184-85 (citation and footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 184-85 n.30 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1976)).
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B. Section 9 is Linked to Habitat Destruction-Palila
The rigid bifurcation of protection for the animal and protection for the
animal's habitat under ESA analysis came to an abrupt end in 1978 when
the District Court of Hawaii handed down its decision in Palila v. Hawaii
Department of Land & Natural Resources (Palila 1).48 The decision, in
addition to saving a tiny endangered bird, polarized and sparked a controver-
sy ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States in its
Sweet Home V decision. An analysis of the Palila cases is necessary to
fully comprehend this landmark Sweet Home V decision.
The palila (Loxiodes bailleui) is a six-inch long, finch-billed bird in the
Hawaiian honycreeper family, a group originally consisting of twenty-three
species and subspecies indigenous only to Hawaii.49 Once common in the
higher altitudes along the slopes of Mauna Kea,50 the palila's range has,
been drastically reduced to a narrow fringe of tropical mamane forest habitat
encircling the mountain." The scientific community attributed the palila's
precipitous decline 2 to the deforestation of the island's groves of mamane
(Sophora chysophylla) and naio (Myoporum sandwicense) trees upon which
the bird relies for its food and nesting sites.53 The destruction of the
mamane forests, in turn, was blamed on feral sheep grazing on the
48. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
49. Id. at 988; Jonathan Durrett & Christopher Yuen, Palila v. Department of Land and
Natural Resources: "Taking" Under Section Nine of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
4 U. HAW. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1982) (citing SHERWIN CARLQUIST, ISLAND BIOLOGY 158
(1974)).
50. Mauna Kea is a dormant volcano located on the island of Hawaii. Durrett & Yuen,
supra note 49, at 183 n.9.
51. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 988-89.
52. The palila was listed as an endangered species by the Secretary of the Interior in
1967. Burton E. Dezendorf, Jr., Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources:
A New Interpretation of "Taking" Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 19 IDAHO L.
REV. 157, 158 (1983).
53. Durrett & Yuen, supra note 49, at 183-84. In 1977, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, upon recommendation by the Palila Recovery Team, designated the remaining
mamane-naio forest as the "critical habitat" of the palila. 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (1977); 42 Fed.
Reg. 40,687 (1977); see generally Dezendorf, supra note 52. Indeed, the scientific evidence
leads to the conclusion that the palila's survival is inseparably linked to the preservation of
the mamane-naio ecosystem in which it has evolved and adapted to survive. Palila 1, 471
F. Supp. at 989 (citing PALILA RECOVERY TEAM, PALILA RECOVERY PLAN 1 (1977)).
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mamane 4  When the suit was originally filed, the palila, mamane, and
sheep all resided almost exclusively on state-owned land."
In efforts to preserve the mamane ecosystem and the palila, the
Hawaiian government embarked on a campaign to eradicate the human-
introduced herds of feral sheep and goats, only to be halted by recreational
hunting interests. 6 When this conservation effort was stalled by sports
hunters targeting the sheep for recreational hunting purposes, the Audobon
Society, the Sierra Club, and one individual brought suit on the palila's
behalf because the bird itself cannot sue. 7 The court held that the
Hawaiian Department of Land and Natural Resources ("Hawaiian DLNR")
was compelled to remove these herds of sheep from the palila's critical
habitat, agreeing with the position taken by the plaintiffs on behalf of the
endangered bird. 8
The plaintiffs claimed that the Hawaiian DLNR's continued mainte-
nance of population of feral sheep and goats, albeit a limited one, amounted
to a "taking" of the palila through the pervasive and continuing degradation
and destruction of its critical habitat. To this end, the plaintiffs sought the
removal of the animals from state-owned palila habitat.5 9 This removal
would ameliorate the critical habitat degradation attributed to the sheep.
The district court in Palila I developed an extensive factual record and
then made several important findings of fact. First, the court found that the
survival of the palila depended upon the preservation of the mamane-naio
ecosystem.' Second, the continued presence of feral sheep and goats in
54. Palila 1, 471 F. Supp. at 990. The mamane leaves, stems, seedlings, and sprouts
served as an important source of food for the browsing sheep. By consuming the mamane
leaves, stems, seedlings and sprouts, the sheep prevented the regeneration of the mamane
forest and, therefore, contributed to its continued decline. Id.
55. Durrett & Yuen, supra note 49, at 184.
56. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 989 n.9. Recreational hunters pressured the Hawaiian
DLNR to maintain some population of feral animals on Mauna Kea as game animals.
57. Id. at 987. Palila I began the modem trend in ESA litigation of naming the
aggrieved species itself as a plaintiff.
58. Id. at 999.
59. Id. at 987.
60. Id. at 989 (finding that the mamane-naio forest is essential for the palila's survival);
see also Dezendorf, supra note 52, at 159. The defendants took issue with this finding,
pointing out that no one can state for certain whether this is true, since no attempts have been
made to breed and keep palila in captivity or in an environment lacking mamane or naio
trees. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 989 n.7. The district court summarily dismissed this
contention finding that all available evidence pointed to the conclusion that the palila's
survival is inseparably linked to the mamane-naio forest. Id. (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 40,687
(1977); PALiLA RECOVERY TEAM, supra note 53, at 32).
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the mamane-naio forest was found to be the primary cause of the destruction
of the palila's critical habitat.6' The court also found that DLNR's efforts
to preserve the mamane-naio forest, the palila, and a limited stock of feral
sheep through intensive management efforts was an ineffective solution to
regeneration of the mamane-naio forest.6' As long as the feral sheep and
goats remained, so too would the pressure from hunting interests to increase
that population.63 Indeed, the court pointed to the destructive effect that
even a small population of the animals may have on the ecosystem 4.
Finally, the district court found the complete removal of the feral sheep and
goats from the palila's critical habitat to be feasible. 5 Sport hunters could
hunt these animals elsewhere, and they could still hunt other species in the
mamane-naio forest.66 Moreover, the complete removal of these animals
from the palila's critical habitat could be accomplished with relatively minor
expense to the state.67
61. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 991. The court engaged in an extensive inquiry into the
effect that these feral sheep and goats have had on the ecosystem. Id. at 990. Relying on
this data, the Palila I court concluded that:
The Mauna Kea Plan [proposed by the Hawaii DLNR] also proposes that
any game animals be eliminated only after further studies have been made; but
no further studies need be done. Plaintiffs have shown (and defendants have
produced no substantial evidence to the contrary) that the Palila requires all of
its designated critical habitat in order to survive as a species and that the feral
sheep and goats maintained by defendants are the major cause of that habitat's
degradation.
Id. at 991. Indeed, the Palila I court, relying on a study conducted by a DLNR biologist,
pointed to a direct correlation between the ability of the mamane to regenerate and the
presence of browsing sheep and goats in the area under study. Id. at 990 n. 11. The district
court further observed that:
There are doubtless other factors, such as disease, drought, insects, frost,
or competition from exotic grasses and weeds, which prevent the regeneration
of the mamane forest. Feral pigs and Mouflon sheep (a study on the latter by
the State is due for completion in 1980) may also contribute to the forest's
decline. However, the Palila Recovery Team is convinced that stopping
destruction of the forest by feral sheep and goats would solve 90 percent of the
problem.
Id. at 990 n.13.
62. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 990 n.13.
63. Id. at 990.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 990-91.
67. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 991.
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In light of these facts, the district court in Palila I briefly considered
the section 9 "taking" claim before concluding:
"Take" is defined in the Act to include "harm" which in turn is defined
in the regulations propounded by the Secretary of the Interior to include
"significant environmental modification or degradation" which actually
injures or kills wildlife. The undisputed facts bring the acts and
omissions of the defendants clearly within these definitions. I conclude
that there is an unlawful "taking" of the Palila.65
As a result, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and their request
for declaratory and injunctive relief were granted.69
An appeal soon followed, and little more than a year later, Palila I was
before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Palila I Appeal).7' The sole
issue on appeal was whether the term "harm" as used in defining "take"
encompassed significant habitat modification.7 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 2 In upholding
the district court's interpretation of the term "take" as it relates to habitat
modification, the circuit court relied on the 1978 definitions of both "harm"
and "harass" found in contemporary Department of the Interior regula-
tions. 73
68. Id. at 995 (citations omitted).
69. See Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources (Palila I Appeal), 639
F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
70. Id.
71. The district court in Palila I actually resolved a number of legal disputes concerning
the ESA. The district court held as a matter of law that jurisdiction and venue were proper
under the ESA, and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue on this matter. Paila 1, 471 F.
Supp. at 991-92. The court also addressed the effect of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
upon the enforcement of the ESA against the states. Id. at 992-99. The district court
concluded, as a matter of law, that neither the Tenth nor the Eleventh Amendments bar the
enforcement of the ESA against a state government violating the prohibitions of § 9(a)(1).
Id. at 995, 999. For analysis of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendment issues addressed in the
district court's Palila decision, see Jack R. Nelson, Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and
Natural Resources: State Governments Fall Prey to the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 10
ECOLOGY L.Q. 281 (1982).
72. Palila I Appeal, 639 F.2d at 496.
73. Following the first Palila litigation, the Department of Interior revised its definitions
of "harm" and "harass" to accommodate the district court's decision. See infra Part III.C.
However, in 1979, at the time of the first Palila litigation, "harm" was defined as:
"Harm" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an act or omission
which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an
extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include, but
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The court observed that a successful Palila I-type section 9 claim
necessitated demonstrating some prohibited impact on the species resulting
from the alleged activity. 4 To this end, the Ninth Circuit concluded that:
The defendant's action in maintaining feral sheep and goats in the
critical habitat is a violation of the Act since it was shown that the
Palila was endangered by the activity. Defendants have not shown us
how the district court erred in determining that the acts and omissions
of the state were prohibited by the Act. The district court's conclusion
is consistent with the Act's legislative history showing that Congress
was informed that the greatest threat to endangered species is the
destruction of their natural habitat. It was supported by all of the expert
opinions.75
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Palila I Appeal must be assessed with
recognition of the extremely supportive fact-finding on the part of the
district court for its conclusions. The court of appeals found a "taking" of
the bird in a relatively conclusory manner, pointing to the district court's
findings of fact and the failure of the State of Hawaii to show where the
district court erred.76
This procedural affirmance may be attributed to the methodology used
by the district court in deciding the case. The science-driven approach taken
by Chief District Judge Samuel King in the Palila I Appeal decision
provided the model for future habitat-based "taking" cases. Judge King's
fact finding regarding the correlation between the effects of the browsing
sheep and the palila's decline was extensive. With extensive fact finding,
the attendant legal analysis was necessarily brief and conclusory.77 The
Palila I-type "taking" case became characterized by fact specific inquiry
resulting in detailed fact finding at the district court level. Then, given the
strong presumption of correctness accorded to the district court's findings
of fact, review by the appellate court in Palila I Appeal was understandably
and appropriately brief.
are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering; significant environmental
modification or degradation which has such effects is included within the
meaning of "harm"....
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1978) (amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981)).
74. Palila lAppeal, 639 F.2d at 497 (citing Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R.
1979)).
75. Id. at 497-98 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978)).
76. Id.
77. See Palla 1, 471 F. Supp. at 995.
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The findings by the district court make Palila I Appeal a thoroughly
grounded case. Empirical inquiry established that the species' decline was
directly and almost exclusively linked to habitat degradation. Sometimes
scientific evidence cannot be clearly marshaled." The decisions in both
the district and circuit courts in Palila were fueled by an exhaustive body
of unrefuted scientific data.79 The "critical link" between habitat degrada-
tion and injury to the species is not always a clear one. Cases involving a
species that is subject to a variety of threats, or a species threatened by a
number of different parties (as opposed to just one party in Palila) multiply
the burden for plaintiffs who must assemble the necessary science to support
judicial conclusions that a Palila-type "taking" has been presented.
78. Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992), is illustrative of what can
happen to a Palila I-type "taking" claim lacking the persuasive scientific data that fueled the
supportive fact finding in the Palila I district court case. Morrill concerned the effects of
development of private property on the northeastern end of Perdido Key upon the highly
endangered Perdido Key beach mouse. Id. at 425. The land immediately to the south of the
parcel in question was state owned land that had been federally designated critical habitat of
the beach mouse. Evidence indicated that the beach mouse had expanded its range outside
of its designated critical habitat and into the private, undeveloped land to the north. Id.
Development of the defendant's land was alleged to constitute a taking of the endangered
mouse. Il at 426. However, the Southern District Court of Alabama disagreed, concluding
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the critical link between destruction of the habitat
on defendant's property and injury to the beach mouse. Id. at 431. Specifically, the evidence
could not conclusively prove that the endangered beach mice were present on the parcel in
question:
There must be some proof of "the critical link between habitat modification and
injury to the species." Plaintiff's only proof as to the link between habitat
modification and injury is dependent upon plaintiffs assertion that the beach
mouse exists on DeWeese's property. For the reasons stated above, the Court
finds that plaintiffs evidence is insufficient in this regard. Moreover, even if the
beach mouse did exist on the relatively small area of suitable habitat found on
DeWeese's property, there is no substantial evidence that the destruction of this
habitat could threaten the species.
Morrill, 822 F. Supp. at 430 (citations omitted). The district court found plaintiffs scientific
studies on the effects of the proposed development upon the beach mouse insufficient.
Morrill, therefore, illustrates how a Palla-type claim can fail if the science is not present to
drive supportive fact finding for concluding a "taking" under the Act. Conversely, Sierra
Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in part on other
grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991), provides an example
of a district court confronted with a formidable body of scientific evidence leading to very
favorable conclusions of law for those trying to protect the red-cockaded woodpecker.
79. See Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 988-91.
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C. The Federal Government Reacts-The Attempted Dilution of
Palila and the Redefinition of Harm
Palila elevated the use of section 9 from a little-known provision in a
poorly understood statute to a formidable cause of action for the protection
of endangered species and their habitat.80 The reaction to the Palila I
Appeal decision was swift and dramatic. In 1981, the United States
Solicitor's Office in the incoming Reagan Administration and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (a division of the Department of Interior) sought to
undo Palila I Appeal.s' The Solicitor's Office read section 9 and the
Secretary's regulatory definition of "harm" as a prohibition against habitat
destruction only when such destruction could be shown to actually kill or
injure wildlife.82 Accordingly, the Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service"),
in a controversial effort to nullify the impact of the Palila I Appeal,
revamped its regulations defining "harm." 83  The new definitions were
codified into regulation by the Secretary in 1981, to prohibit only significant
habitat modifications that actually kill or injure wildlife. 4 "Harm" rising
to the level of a "taking" could not be shown by habitat modification alone;
for this, the Service asserted, was unsupported by the legislative history of
the Act and violative of the ESA.85
The major impacts of this redefinition were twofold. The first major
change came in the form of a newly-emphasized restriction on the Palila I
Appeal, requiring a demonstration that a habitat modification leading to a
section 9 "taking" must actually kill or injure members of a protected
species. A showing of habitat degradation alone will not amount to
80. Cheever, supra note 19, at 146.
81. In fact, some critics who saw Palla I as being correctly decided, suggested that the
Service, in an apparent attempt to reverse the case through regulation and avoid its results,
was engaging in a constitutionally questionable course of conduct. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749
(1981).
82. 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490-91 (1981). The Solicitor's Office, in the spirit of the times,
attributed Palila I to a "fundamental confusion over the distinction between habitat
modification and takings." Id. at 29,492.
83. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981).
84. Id.
85. Id. While the legislative history behind § 9 indicates a congressional intent to read
the term "take" broadly, the Service concluded that the history of § 9 did indeed support a
broad reading of the term "take." However, the Service concluded that "take" cannot be read
to prohibit habitat modification absent actual injury. Id.
86. Id. at 54,749. The Service points to the preamble of the original harm definition:
"Harm" covers actions . . .which actually (as opposed to potentially) cause
injury . . . . By moving the concept of environmental degradation to the
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"harm," rising to the level of a "taking" under the Palila I Appeal, unless
actual injury or death to the species is also proven. 7 Thus, "[i]n the
opinion of the Service, the final redefinition sufficiently clarifies the
restraints of section 9 so as to avoid injury to protected wildlife due to
significant habitat modification, while at the same time precluding a taking
where no actual injury is shown.""8 It is, therefore, significant to note that
the Service's actions, while clearly limiting the impact of the Palila I
Appeal, never actually questioned the underlying principle that a "taking"
may result from significant habitat alteration. 9 What the Service sought
to accomplish through this redefinition of "harm," was the addition of a
formidable element of causation into the section 9 "taking" cause of action,
along with the introduction of some notion that the actual modification of
habitat must be more than de minimis. "To be subject to section 9, the
modification or degradation must be significant, must significantly impair
essential behavioral patterns, and must result in actual injury to a protected
wildlife species. 9
0
However, while limiting the impact of the Palila I Appeal, the new
definition of "harm" simultaneously conceded the most significant aspect of
the Palila I Appeal opinion-the notion that a species could indeed be
"taken" through the alteration of its habitat. Recognition of this very basic
premise was far from universal in 1981. 9' Rather, the Service remained
definition of "harm," potential restrictions on environmental modifications are
expressly limited to those actions causing actual death or injury to a protected
species of fish or wildlife. The actual consequence of such action upon a listed
species is paramount.
46 Fed. Reg. 54,749 (1981) (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412-13 (1975)). Thus, the requirement
that habitat modification actually kill or injure in order to amount to a § 9 "taking" is nothing
new. Rather, Palila I Appeal has apparently forced the Service to amend its regulations to
better reflect this sentiment as intended in the original "harm" definition. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.; see also Cheever, supra note 19, at 149.
90. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749. The inclusion of "actually" (as in "actually kills or injures")
was intended by. the Service to "bulwark the need for proven injury to a species due to a
party's actions." This injury could occur through the significant impairment of essential
behavioral patterns such as breeding, feeding, and sheltering. Id.
91. See, e.g., North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The district court in North Slope
Borough only gave a cursory glance at the § 9 claim, concluding that the possibility of a
future taking through modification of the Bowhead whale's habitat did not require the
government to halt the oil exploration being challenged in that case. Id. at 362. Thus, North
Slope Borough first raised the distinction between present harm and potential harm resolved
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myopically confined to the narrow concern over the possibility of a flood
of section 9 litigation claiming "takings" based solely on habitat modifica-
tion, and without any showing of "actual" injury or "harm" to the spe-
cies.92
Though arguably curtailing the overall effectiveness of the Palila I
Appeal as a means of protecting the habitat of a protected species, the basic
principle that a "taking" could result from habitat modification became more
firmly established as a result of the Service's actions. In fact, throughout
its response to public comments on the proposed redefinition, the Service
repeatedly declined the invitation by many to limit harm to direct physical
injury to an individual member of a species:
Congress made its intent to protect species and their habitat very clear.
It did not, however, express any intention to protect habitat under
section 9 where there was no appurtenant showing of death or injury to
a protected species.... Thus, to the extent that comments recommend
further limitations, they misconstrued the intent of the rulemaking.93
The regulations, as amended in 1981, sought both the adoption and reversal
of certain aspects of the Palila I Appeal decision.
D. Congress Reacts-Genesis of the "Incidental Taking"
Exception
The Palila I Appeal also brought swift reaction from Congress. This
reaction became manifest in the Endangered Species Act Amendments of
1982."' The most significant of these changes were the inclusion of so-
called "incidental take" exceptions to the prohibitions of section 7 and
section 9.95
by the court in Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources
(Palila I/), 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). On
review in the District of Columbia Circuit Court, the court did not even address the § 9
claim.
92. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749. Additionally, the Solicitor's Office pointed to its own
concerns that perhaps the district court in Palila I had misconstrued the biological evidence
presented and had instead substituted its own judgment in finding "harm" to the palila bird
in that case. Id.
93. Id.
94. Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982).
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(1) The Secretary may permit, under such terms and conditions as he
shall prescribe-
(A) any act otherwise prohibited by [section 9] of this title for
scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the
affected species, including, but not limited to, acts necessary for
the establishment and maintenance of experimental populations
pursuant to subsection (j) of this section; or
(B) any taking otherwise prohibited by [section 9(a)(1)(B)] of this
title if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.96
Thus, newly-added section 10(a)(1) provides two means by which a
person may avoid the consequences of section 9(a)(1). The first exception
describes "takings" for "scientific purposes," and for the enhancement of the
propagation or survival of the affected species.97 This technically inten-
tioned exception typically encompasses recovery activities such as tagging,
captive breeding, and establishment of experimental populations aimed at
reintroduction of a species into its formerly occupied range.98 However,
section 10(a)(1)(B) permits any taking otherwise prohibited by section
96. Id. (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(a)(1)(A), (B) (1994)).
97. Id. (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A)).
98. Department of Interior regulations detail the criteria considered in issuing or denying
"scientific purpose" permits under § 10(a)(1)(A). See 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(a) (1994). In
addition to general permit criteria found at 50 C.F.R. § 13.21(b) (1994), the Secretary,
through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, must also consider.
(i) Whether the purpose for which the permit is required is adequate to
justify removing from the wild or otherwise changing the status of the wildlife
sought to be covered by the permit;
(ii) The probable direct and indirect effect which issuing the permit would
have on the wild populations of the wildlife sought to be covered by the permit;
(iii) Whether the permit, if issued, would in any way, directly or
indirectly, conflict with any known program intended to enhance the survival
probabilities of the population from which the wildlife sought to be covered by
the permit was or would be removed;
(iv) Whether the purpose for which the permit is required would be likely
to reduce the threat of extinction facing the species of wildlife sought to be
covered by the permit;
(v) The opinions or views of scientists or other persons or organizations
having expertise concerning the wildlife or other matters germane to the
application; and
(vi) Whether the expertise, facilities, or other resources available to the
applicant appear adequate to successfully accomplish the objectives stated in the
application.
50 C.F.R. § 17.22(a)(2)(i)-(vi); see generally ROHLF, supra note 3, at 82-86.
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9(a)(1), so long as the "taking" is incidental to an "otherwise lawful
activity."" That is, the activity may accidentally effect a "taking" under
section 9, but may be exempt from prosecution under section 10 depending
upon case by case circumstances. 10° In any case, no "incidental take"
permit will be issued by the Secretary to any person without the submission
of a satisfactory conservation plan including adequate safeguards to reduce
the impact of the "incidental take." 101
The conservation plan required under section 10(a)(2)(A) must include
and detail the anticipated impact of the activity on listed species in
proximity of the proposed activity, the applicant's efforts to mitigate those
impacts, any alternatives to a "taking" available to the applicant, and any
other necessary and appropriate measures required by the plan."2
Based upon the described activities in the permit application, and the
submitted conservation plan, the Secretary must then make the following
determination before an "incidental take" will be permitted under section
10(a): 1) that any "taking" will in fact be incidental; 2) that the applicant
will minimize and mitigate the impacts of the "taking" to the maximum
extent practicable; 3) that the applicant will ensure that the conservation
plan's implementation is adequately funded; 4) that "the taking will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species
in the wild"; 5) that any other necessary and appropriate measures required
by the Secretary will also be met; and 6) that the Secretary is provided with
other assurances that the plan will be implemented. 1°3 Congress' reaction
to the Palila I Appeal decision was observably more tempered than that of
the Service. While section 10(a) provides an exception to the otherwise
absolute and categorical ban in section 9, the standards for that exception are
quite rigorous and protective of the species being impacted."t 4
99. Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96 Stat. at 1422 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a)(1)(B)).
100. Id.
101. Id. (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)).
102. Id.
103. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2). Department of Interior regulations also require the
Secretary, through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, to "consider the anticipated
duration and geographic scope of the applicant's planned activities, including the amount of
listed species habitat that is involved and the degree to which listed species and their habitats
are affected." Id.
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E. Palila ll-Identifying the "Critical Link Between Habitat
Modification and Injury to the Species"
The mamane and naio forests of Hawaii's Mauna Kea and the tiny
palila they harbored were again destined to rise to the forefront of the
persistent controversy over the scope of section 9. Palila v. Hawaii
Department of Land and Natural Resources (Palila 11)1°5 virtudaly dupli-
cated the facts and issues litigated only five years earlier." The palila's
critical habitat was still being grazed by non-indigenous animals, only this
time the adverse impacts were caused by exotic mouflon sheep rather than
the feral animals removed following Palila L"°
The district court in Palila II was presented with the Secretary's
revamped "harm" regulation. Palila II, reduced to its essence, examined
whether the Service's redefinition of "harm," in the Secretary's amended
regulatory definition, embodied a substantial change from the previous
definition.' The district court, in a cogent legal analysis, answered that
question resoundingly in the negative." 9
Throughout the trial, the Hawaiian DLNR emphasized the difference
between "potential" harm and "actual" harm.' They argued that the
plaintiffs could show no present pattern of decline in the palila's numbers;
thus, the Hawaiian DLNR insisted that any harm done to the palila due to
105. (Palila I1), 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1988).
106. See Cheever, supra note 19, at 152-53.
107. The distinction between the two was described by the district court. "Feral" refers
to animals that, while once domesticated, now roam wild. On the contrary, mouflon sheep
are wild game animals that were taken from the wilds of Corsica and Sardinia and introduced
onto slopes of Mauna Kea between 1962 and 1966. Like the feral sheep and goats, the
mouflon were maintained in the palila's habitat for sport hunting purposes. Palila II, 649 F.
Supp. at 1074. During the initial Palila I litigation, a mouflon sheep study was still
underway to determine the extent of the mouflon's destructive effects upon the mamane. See
Palila 1, 471 F. Supp. at 990 n.13.
108. See ROHLF, supra note 3, at 63-64.
109. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1075. The court in Palila II had already stated its
position on this issue at the summary judgment stage of the proceeding. Palila v. Hawaiian
Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 631 F. Supp. 787 (D. Haw. 1985). At that time, the
defendants continuously argued that the amendments to the regulation had worked substantial
changes upon the meaning of the term "harm," but the court refused to adopt their
interpretation. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1075 n.18. Since the government had apparently
failed to recognize the court's position at this earlier proceeding, the district court in Palila
II saw the need to elaborate on its conclusion that the amendments still prohibited destruction
of habitat. Id.
110. Id. at 1075.
1996]
23
Plante and Baumann: Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon: P
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
the mouflon sheep's destructive browsing habits was, at best, a potential
one. 111  The DLNR also observed that the palila, whose population
numbers remained constant throughout the controversy, had not been
actually harmed as required under the Secretary's revised "harm" regula-
tion."' Mere adverse impact to the habitat, they contended, did not
amount to "harn" under the Act and the regulation." 3
The district court emphatically rejected this "shortsighted and limited
interpretation of 'harm"' concluding that:
A finding of "harm" does not require death to individual members of
the species; nor does it require a finding that habitat degradation is
presently driving the species further toward extinction. Habitat
destruction that prevents the recovery of the species by affecting
essential behavioral patterns causes actual injury to the species and
effects a taking under section 9 of the Act.114
Palila II clearly and deliberately expanded the scope of section 9
beyond the bounds set only a few years earlier in Palila I. In evaluating the
significance of the Service's redefinition of "harm," the district court held
that the Service explicitly declined to limit "harm" to "direct physical injury
to an individual member of a wildlife species."'" 5  In fact, the Service
attributed the regulation's revision to the following purpose:
The purpose of the redefinition was to preclude claims of a Section 9
taking for habitat modification alone without any attendant death or
111. Id. Specifically, the Hawaiian Government argued that the mouflon sheep do not
presently harm the palila because the sheep feed primarily on the shoots and sprouts of the
mamane trees. The palila derives its sustenance from the seeds and seed pods of the mature
trees. Therefore, the government argued that the browsing activities did not presently deny
the palila of its food source. The government contended that any harm to the palila could
only be indirect and in the future, as the browsing mouflon, at most, merely prevented
regeneration of the mamane trees over the coming years. Id.
112. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1075. This apparently was a distinct argument against
the existence of any "actual injury." Since, as the Hawaiian DLNR reasoned, "harm"
required actual death or injury, this showing would be substantially undermined by the fact
that the palila population had remained static and may have even increased in spite of the
continued grazing activity of the mouflon sheep.
113. The Hawaiian DLNR's argument was a linear one. Harm to the mamane and naio
forest did not, in and of itself, equal "actual harm" to the palila. The population of the palila
had not declined since Palila I and had even slightly increased. Preventing "harm" to the
trees was beyond the protection intended under the ESA. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1077 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981)).
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injury of the protected wildlife. Death or injury, however, may be
caused by impairment of essential behavioral patterns which can have
significant and permanent effects on a listed species."
6
Clearly, the Service declined to limit "harm" to direct applications of
physical force or violence aimed at an individual animal."7 Yet, the
Hawaiian DLNR asserted that habitat modification prohibited under section
9 must be limited to occasions where direct physical injury or killing of
individual palila birds was the direct and intended consequence of the
modification-precisely what the Service declined to do in amending the
regulation.
The district court's focus on injury to the species as a whole is
consistent with the revised "harm" regulation after Palila I." What the
Service accomplished through its redefined term is that "harm" via habitat
modification requires two elements: significant habitat modification and
116. Id.
117. At this point in the district court's decision, Judge King took an opportunity to
answer criticisms of his Palila I opinion raised during the 1981 amendments to the "harm"
regulation. Judge King concluded that the Service had misconstrued his earlier ruling in
Palila L Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1076 n.21.
Contrary to the assertions [of the DLNR, the court] did not find that habitat
modification alone caused harm to the Palila. On the contrary, the evidence
considered at the summary judgment hearing overwhelmingly showed that the
feral animals had a drastic negative impact on the mamane forest, which in turn
injured the Palila by significantly disrupting its essential behavioral habits.
Id. (citations omitted).
118. See id. at 1077. Judge King's response to criticisms leveled at his Pala I decision
by the Service suggests that, from the outset, his focus remained on the injury to the species
as a whole and the purpose of the ESA-recovery of listed species:
By consuming the shoots and seedlings, the [feral sheep] prevented the regenera-
tion of the forest and thus brought about the "relentless decline of the Palila's
habitat."
The record was similarly clear that this loss of habitat was the single most
important factor limiting the Palila population. Continued destruction of the
forest would have driven the bird into extinction. As it was, the bird was, and
still is, at the critical population level, that is, perched on the verge of extinction.
The bird is thus highly susceptible to harm from other environmental factors,
such as fire or drought. At the time then, the continued presence of feral sheep
had a severe negative impact on the Palila by indirectly suppressing the
population figures to a level which threatened extinction and by preventing the
expansion or recovery of the population. These factors supported my decision
to order removal of the feral sheep and goats in Palila L
Id. at 1078 (citation omitted).
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actual injury. If a "critical link between habitat modification and actual
injury to the species" can be shown, the section 9 claim will succeed." 9
This "critical link" draws habitat modification into the folds of the "take"
concept found in section 9. The presence of an actual injury or instances
of habitat destruction likely to significantly and adversely affect a listed
species now can amount to a prohibited "taking."
'120
After Palila II, the "critical link between habitat modification and
injury to the species" could be established in one of two ways: 1) by
showing that the activity has an adverse impact on the species or 2) by
showing that the activity prevents the recovery of a species.12' The
district court rejected the contention that the establishment of this "critical
link" required either the proven death or injury of individual members of the
species, or some demonstrated decline in population numbers.'22
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling
that the palila had indeed been "taken" within the meaning of the amend-
ments to the Department of Interior's regulation defining "harm. ' 23
Significantly, the court of appeals limited its review to the district court's
focus on the harm to the species as a whole and the question of whether the
district court erred in finding that "harm" included habitat modification that
could drive the palila to extinction. 24  The court acknowledged the
119. Id. As the district court opined, "[t]he redefinition stresses the critical link between
habitat modification and injury to the species. Obviously since the purpose of the
Endangered Species Act is to protect endangered wildlife, there can be no finding of a taking
unless habitat modification or degradation has an adverse impact on the protected species."
Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1077.
120. Palila II reduced the inquiry to a two-part analysis centered on the element of
causation. A significant habitat modification must first be established. Then, this
modification must be linked to the actual death or injury of wildlife. This element of
connectedness distinguishes prohibited "takings" from other incidental activities affecting
habitat without adversely affecting the species.
121. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1077.
122. Id.
123. Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources (Palila
II Appeal), 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
124. Id. at 1108. The circuit court concluded that the district court's inclusion within
the definition of "harm" of habitat destruction that could drive the species to extinction fell
within the Secretary of Interior's construction of the term. However, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals declined to decide whether habitat modification not threatening the palila with
extinction, but hindering recovery of the species, was also properly included within the
Secretary's definition. Id. at 1110-11.
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deference given to the Secretary's interpretation of "harm," citing this
standard of review as a principal reason for its holding.'2
5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with the district court's
assessment that the inclusion of habitat destruction contributing to extinction
was consistent with the Secretary's "harm" regulation.126 Interpreting
"harm" in this manner advanced the overall objectives of the ESA by
"'[providing] a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved .... ""' This
interpretation, the court reasoned, also was entirely consistent with
Congress' desire to provide an expansive reading of the term "take," as
evidenced by the legislative history of the Act.12 1 The Palila II Appeal
both affirmed the district court's construction of "harm" to include habitat
modification that threatens a species with extinction and upheld the
Secretary of Interior's definition of "harm" as consistent with the ESA. But
this ruling fell short of a complete answer to the controversy.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to reach the question of
whether the regulation's "actual death or injury" requirement could be
satisfied by a habitat modification that hampered a species' recovery as
opposed to precipitating its extinction." 9 The precise scope of the issue
left unaddressed by the court's declination remains unclear. 3 ' In the first
instance, the opinion passed on the question of whether "harm" included
"habitat degradation that merely retards recovery."'' Yet, only a few
sentences later, the court pronounced its decision to pass on the issue of
125. Id. at 1108 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
131 (1985) (upholding the Secretary of the Army's regulations including hydrologically
connected wetlands within the jurisdictional term "navigable waters," the dredging and filling
of which requires a permit under § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act)).
126. Id.
127. Palila IIAppeal, 852 F.2d at 1108 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988)).
128. Id. (relying on S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2989, 2995). In defining "take" in § 3(12) of the ESA, Congress has arguably made its
intentions clear. "'[take' is defined in section 3(12) in the broadest possible manner to
include every conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or
wildlife." S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2995.
129. Palila HAppeal, 852 F.2d at 1110.
130. See id. From the court's statements it is possible to draw two different
conclusions. The circuit court may have only declined to address temporary setbacks to a
species' recovery, while otherwise including habitat modifications presenting a permanent and
total impediment to recovery efforts in its principal holding. Conversely, the court may have
refused to reach the more general issue of whether hindrance to a species recovery can
legally amount to "actual injury" to a species.
131. Id. at 1110 (emphasis added).
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whether "harm" includes those activities that prevent recovery. 32 The
first passage indicates the court's inclusion within "harm" of those activities
that prevent recovery, suggesting that the court hesitated to extend "harm"
to activities that "merely" present a temporary or short term impairment to
the species' recovery. In light of this statement, the second pronouncement
is enigmatic. It purports to cover "habitat degradation that prevents recov-
ery." '133 It is, therefore, unclear whether the variance between these two
declarations is purposeful.
In reality, the distinction between threats to survival and the impairment
of recovery is a significant one. The goal of the ESA is to "recover"
endangered and threatened species, not merely to maintain these species in
a continuing state of endangerment.' 34 A large category of activities may
hamper the achievement of this goal while still falling short of precipitating
a species' extinction. If such a distinction were acknowledged, a number of
activities could be permitted that, while not threatening a species with
extinction, will nevertheless ensure perpetual enrollment on the growing
roster of endangered and threatened fauna.
F. Post Palila 1-Meeting the "Critical Link" Requirement
Palila II, in practice, reduced the "taking" inquiry to a question of
causation and what level of connectedness must be demonstrated by a
preponderance of evidence to prove a violation of section 9. American Bald
Eagle v. Bhatti135 is illustrative on this point. Bhatti began as a suit to bar
deer hunting on a state reservation to avoid alleged risks to bald eagles
132. Id. at 1111 (emphasis added).
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. The stated purpose of the ESA is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved" and "to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered and threatened species." Pub.
L. No. 93-205, § 2, 87 Stat. at 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)). Conservation
of endangered and threatened species is defined in the ESA as "the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the
point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer necessary." Id. §
3, 87 Stat. at 885 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3)).
Upon listing a species as endangered or threatened under the provisions of ESA § 4,
the Secretary is directed to develop and implement "recovery plans" for the conservation and
survival of the listed species unless he finds that the development of a recovery plan will not
promote the species' conservation. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 11, 92 Stat. at 3766 (redesignated
as § 4(f) by Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 2(a), 96 Stat. at 1411; current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1533(f)).
135. 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993).
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present on the site.13 6 The alleged risk to the eagle came in the form of
the ingestion of lead shot from the carrion of deer that have been shot, but
not recovered by the hunter.137 Analogizing to other environmental
regulations, the plaintiffs asked the court to impose a human health-based
numerical standard of "one in a million risk of harm" for determining when
a "taking" has occurred.3 The First Circuit Court of Appeals declined
to do so, concluding that while such numeric standards are appropriate for
EPA pollution control regulations, they were not proper for determining
"harm" under the Secretary's regulation.'39 Rather, the proper standard for
determining a "taking" under the regulation is the presence of "actual harm,"
which requires a greater degree of connectedness than a calculated
possibility of harm under a numeric standard."a4  While bald eagles can be
harmed by ingesting lead, the plaintiffs were unable to introduce evidence
demonstrating that they had actually consumed harmful levels of lead. 4'
Thus, the court acknowledged that the regulation requires a qualitative,
rather than a bare quantitative standard for making decisions under the ESA.
G. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Lujan-Raising a Direct Challenge to Palila in the District
Court
In 1992, Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Lujan (Sweet Home /) 42 raised the controversy surrounding section 9 to
the next level of analysis. While previous courts limited their consideration
to the question of whether a particular habitat modification amounted to
"harm" resulting in a "taking" under section 9, the United States District
136. Id. at 164.
137. Id. The core of the plaintiffs' case was that some of the deer shot at the
reservation would not be recovered and would subsequently die of their wounds. These
"cripple loss deer" would still carry the lead shot from the hunter's gun and the bald eagles,
among other animals, would ingest this lead while feeding on the carcasses. Id.
138. Id. at 165. Similar health-based standards are set by the Environmental Protection
Agency in regulating discharges under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. These
numeric standards set the amount of a pollutant to be tolerated based on the level of risk that
the tolerated concentrations will pose to human health. See, e.g., National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,521-27 (1984).
139. American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 165 (1st Cir. 1993).
140. Id. at 165-66.
141. Id. at 166. This case, like Morrill v. Lujan, presents a case where the plaintiffs
were unable to establish sufficient scientific proof of "actual injury" resulting from the
alleged habitat modification. See Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
142. 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992).
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Court for the District of Columbia was asked to consider whether habitat
modification or degradation could be a taking at all. The suit was a direct
attack on the very basis of the Palila line of cases and a direct challenge to
the regulatory structure of section 9 as it had stood for more than a decade.
The case was brought by a number of small land owners, logging and
timber companies, and individuals dependent in varying degrees upon the
logging industry in the Pacific Northwest and in the southeastern United
States. 43 The plaintiffs (the "Chapter") challenged restrictions placed
upon logging activities on private property by the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service in its efforts to avoid Palla-type "takings" of the
endangered red-cockaded woodpecker"4 and the threatened northern
spotted owl 45 in violation of section 9.1' The restrictions allegedly
resulted in a host of economic injuries to the plaintiffs and reached
impermissibly beyond the scope of section 9 protections.1 47
The Chapter attacked two specific regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the Interior for the enforcement of section 9.141 The primary
focus remained on the Secretary's regulation defining "harm" under the Act.
The Chapter insisted that this regulation was, on its face, both contrary to
the ESA and fatally vague under the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due
process of law. 49  The Chapter also attacked the regulation extending
section 9's protections to threatened species of wildlife. 50
143. Id. at 282. The plaintiffs consisted of Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for
a Great Oregon, Betty F. Orem, Erickson Busheling, Inc., Southeastern Lumber Manufactur-
ers Association, Inc., Southern Timber Purchasers Council, Ridgetree Logging Company,
Shotpouch Logging Company, Jean Reynolds, Emmy G. Birkenfield, and Pat McCollum.
See Brief for Petitioners at ii, Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) (No. 94-859).
144. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1994). The red-cockaded woodpecker was listed under the
Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, the predecessor to the modem ESA. Pub.
L. No. 91-135, §§ 1-12, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed'by Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 14, 87 Stat.
903).
145. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h). "Taking" a threatened northern spotted owl is prohibited
pursuant to Department of Interior regulations promulgated under § 4(d) of the ESA. 50
C.F.R. § 17.31(a).
146. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 282.
147. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the restrictions forced them to lay off
employees and down-size their operations. Moreover, the restrictions were purported to have
limited their incomes, reduced the supply of timber and to have imposed substantial
economic hardships upon a number of individuals and families. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 282.
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After agreeing on the absence of any genuine disputes of material fact,
both parties moved for summary judgment on the legal issues presented."'
Because the areas owned by, or of interest to, the plaintiffs contained habitat
and/or populations of the listed wildlife, the plaintiffs were uncertain about
disturbance or harvest in these areas for fear that a section 9 violation would
be charged against them. 52 The suit was filed to avoid an enforcement
action. In a carefully formulated response, the district court denied the
plaintiffs' motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
the Department of Interior.' Regarding section 9 of the ESA, the court
found Congress' intentions clear and unequivocal; the term "take" was to be
read "'in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in
which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." '' l
The ESA and its legislative history supported this conclusion.5
First and foremost, the Chapter argued that by including habitat
modification and degradation as a form of "harm," the regulatory definition
promulgated by the Secretary in the Code of Federal Regulations"5 6
exceeded the intentions of Congress. 7 This argument was soundly
rejected by the district court through application of the principles espoused
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council. 8 Under
151. Id. at 281.
152. The plaintiffs generally alleged that the Service has placed restrictions on timber
harvesting in the Pacific Northwest and in the Southeast in order to avoid a Palla-type
"taking" of the owl and other endangered wildlife. Id. at 282. However, the plaintiffs made
no claims or allegations of actual or threatened criminal enforcement of the regulation against
them. Id. at 285. Instead, the Chapter asserted that "[tihe [Service] relies on the regulation
to warn landowners that it considers certain land uses harmful to certain listed species (as
by interfering with breeding or foraging patterns), and that engaging in such activities will
subject the actor to agency enforcement." Brief for Respondents at 4, Babbit (No. 94-859)
(citations omitted). 'These warnings put landowners on "notice," of course, and thus
facilitate criminal enforcement for a "knowing" violation of the Act." Id. at 4 n.5. "As a
practical matter, 'persons whose extended conduct might be found a 'take,' and who thus are
exposed to criminal penalties . . . are under commanding pressure to comply' with the
[Service's] view of 'harm,' either by foregoing such conduct or by applying for an incidental
take permit." Id.
153. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 281.
154. Id. at 283 (citing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2995); see also H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 15 (1973), microformed on
CIS 73-H563-9 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
155. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
156. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
157. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
158. Id. at 285 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
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the well-known Chevron two-step analysis, the clear intent of Congress must
prevail. 59 In the absence of such clear intent, any permissible interpreta-
tion of a federal statute made by the agency charged with its administration
will be upheld.' 6°
The court rejected the Chapter's position based on the second prong of
the Chevron test and supported the Secretary's interpretation.1 6' The
Chapter unsuccessfully raised a triumvirate of arguments for their position
that Congress did not intend the term "take" to reach habitat modification
and that the Secretary's interpretation was impermissible. 62 They argued
that the origin of the definition counseled against this construction, that
another section of the ESA provided a remedy if necessary, and that the
Secretary's definition was impermissibly broad. In rejecting the Chapter's
claims, the court explained why each of these arguments failed.
159. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
160. Id. at 843. In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court reviewed challenges to
Environmental Protection Agency regulations permitting states "to treat all pollution-emitting
devices within the same industrial grouping as through they were encased within a single
'bubble'." Id. at 840. In the course of that review, the court pronounced the following two-
step analysis guiding the judicial review of agency interpretations of federal statutes:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43. The Chevron analysis is premised upon the long-recognized view that
considerable weight and deference must be paid to the executive department's interpretations
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer. Id. at 844.
161. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 284. The district court initially examined the
legislative history supporting the ESA, concluding that the Congress' intentions as stated in
the Act and its history clearly support interpreting "take" in the broadest possible manner.
Id. (construing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2995).
Thus armed, the district court was in a position to discard the plaintiffs' claim under the first
step in the Chevron analysis. Having found a "clear congressional intent" the inquiry into
the Secretary's interpretation should end at that point. However, the district court chose to
bolster its opinion by demonstrating that the plaintiffs' claims fell equally short of the mark
on the second prong of the Chevron test. See id. at 285.
162. Id. at 283-85.
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First, the Chapter questioned the permissibility of the Secretary's
interpretation of "harm" by pointing to the origins of the "take" defini-
tion.163 The original ESA bill, Senate Bill 1983, broadly defined "take"
to include "'destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or
range.""'  However, when Senate Bill 1983 was reported out of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, this provision was deleted.1 65 The
Chapter pointed to this omission as compelling evidence that Congress did
not intend "take" to encompass habitat destruction. '6 The court dis-
agreed.1
67
The district court noted that Senate Bill 1983 was one of two ESA bills
considered by the Senate Committee on Commerce. 6' The other, Senate
Bill 1592, defined "take" in its adopted form. 69 The court reasoned that
this legislative history could stand for no more than the proposition that the
Senate chose one definition over another.' As for any conscious deci-
sion to remove explicit references to habitat destruction from the "take"
provision, the court found this characterization of the legislative history far
too speculative.17 ' The historical evidence supporting the Chapter's
position was insufficient to overcome the traditional deference accorded the
Secretary's interpretation under Chevron.
The Chapter also argued that the Secretary's interpretation of "harm"
was impermissible in light of Congress' alleged desire to address habitat
concerns exclusively through the federal land acquisition provisions found
in section 4 of the ESA."' Pursuant to section 4, the Secretary is given
the authority to utilize land acquisition and other measures to implement
recovery programs for endangered and threatened species. 73 By including
163. Id. at 283.
164. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
165. Id.
166. Id. The premise underlying the plaintiffs' contention was that the reference was
purposefully deleted by the Senate Committee expressing a desire to curtail the definition of
"take" and exclude habitat modification as a course of conduct that may result in a "taking."
Id.
167. Id.





173. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 5, 87 Stat. at 889 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1)
(1994)). Section 5 provides, in relevant, part that to carry out a program to conserve
endangered or threatened species, the appropriate Secretary:
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this provision, the Chapter suggested that Congress had provided the
Secretary with the means to protect habitat through public purchase of
private property. 74 This protective measure, the Chapter reasoned, was
intended to be the sole and exclusive means by which the problem of habitat
destruction was to be addressed.'75 Any further protection under section
9 would, therefore, render section 5 a nullity.176 This argument also was
rejected by the district court.177  While the ESA's legislative history
revealed an intent that federal land acquisition play an important role in
habitat preservation, the court was unable to find any indication that land
acquisition was to be the "exclusive protective mechanism for listed species'
habitat. '178
The Act and its underlying legislative history instead lent credence to
the notion that land acquisition was intended to be just one of several
protective mechanisms at the Secretary's disposal. 179  The Act itself
empowers the Secretary to "utilize the land acquisition and other authority"
provided under a number of federal acts to carry out conservation pro-
grams. 80 Specific statements in the legislative history also countered the
Chapter's position.1
8 1
(1) shall utilize the land acquisition and other authority under the Fish and
Wildlife Act of 1956 .... the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act .... and the
Migratory Bird Conservation Act, as appropriate; and
(2) is authorized to acquire by purchase, donation, or otherwise, lands,
waters, or interests therein, and such authority shall be in addition to any other
land acquisition authority vested in him.
Id. (citations omitted).





179. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
180. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1)) (emphasis added).
181. The district court points to two specific statements found in the legislative history
leading to the passage of § 4 of the Act. In considering § 4, a House Conference Report
provided, inter alia, that "[a]ny effective program for the conservation of endangered species
demands that there be adequate authority vested in the program managers to acquire habitat
which is critical to the survival of the species." Id. at 283 (quoting H.R. CON. REP. No.
740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3001, 3004). The
second statement relied upon by the district court is found in the Senate Committee on
Commerce's Report on Senate Bill 1983, which recognized that protection of habitat was
often the only means of protecting endangered animals occurring on private lands. Id.
(construing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2995).
Clearly, these schemes are intended to be mutually supporting (not mutually exclusive) means
[Vol. 20
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Finally, the Chapter questioned the permissibility of the Secretary's
interpretation on the ground that "harm" was added to the definition of
"take" via a technical amendment which was never debated by Congress.
In light of this, the Chapter reasoned that the expansive interpretation
ascribed to the term "harm" by the Secretary was inappropriate."'2
In rejecting this claim, the district court's reasoning was two-fold.
First, the court reiterated its conclusion that the Secretary's definition of the
term "harm" was entirely compatible with Congress' definition of
"take."' 3 Although the Chapter suggested that the Secretary's regulation
encompassing land use and habitat destruction stood at variance with every
other component of the "take" definition, the'court found the plaintiff s own
argument flawed since it also relied on an overly-broad interpretation of the
Secretary's regulation.' The district court found the term "harm"
sufficiently similar to the terms hunt, harass, and pursue, since the
interpretation of the term "harm" limited its application only to those habitat
modifications that actually kill or injure wildlife. 5
The Secretary correctly points out, however, that not all habitat
modification actions constitute "harm" under the § 17.3 definition;
rather, only an action which "actually kills or injures wildlife" falls into
the category of "harm." The Secretary's definition thus requires proof
of actual killing or injury to wildlife, consistent with the ESA's
definition of "take."186
This statement is somewhat disingenuous in light of Palila II which held the
"actual death or injury" requirement satisfied by injury to the species as a
whole and not just injury to individual animals was required to show a
to accomplish the species recovery purposes of the Act. Id. at 284.
182. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 284.
183. Id.
184. Id. The Chapter argued that "harm," unlike every other component of the "take"
definition, was expanded to include habitat destruction and land use, while the other terms
such as "hunt," "pursue," and "shoot" are not provided with such an expansive definition.
See id. (citing Plaintiffs' Mem. for Summary Judgment at 21, Babbit (No. 94-859)). This
argument, relying on the nocitur a sociis principle of statutory construction, played a much
more prominent role in the several appellate opinions that followed. See generally, Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbit (Sweet Home I), 1 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
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"taking."' 87 In a relatively conclusory manner, the District of Columbia
district court avoided much of the holding of the Hawaiian district court in
Palila H."'
The district court ultimately resolved this argument on the grounds that
Congress, when reauthorizing the ESA in 1982, was aware of the Palila
decisions and, nevertheless, declined the opportunity to reverse these
decisions through legislation." 9  The court observed that Congress'
reaction to Palila II was instead found in the amendments to section
10(a),' 90 evidencing a congressional desire to accommodate the Secretary's
definition of "harm" and ratify the interpretation found in Palila I. The
court concluded that the Chapter failed to meet its burden under the Chevron
analysis.' 9 ' In accordance with the Supreme Court's Chevron analysis, the
district court deferred to the discretion of the Secretary and upheld the
regulation."9
The Chapter also advanced the theory that the "harm" definition was
fatally vague and, therefore, in contravention of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 193  Under the "void for vagueness" doctrine, the Due
Process Clause demands that criminal statutes define criminal offenses with
a sufficient degree of definiteness so as to adequately inform ordinary
people of the type of conduct being prohibited and to discourage the
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute. 194 In essence, a
187. Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources (Palila
I), 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
188. The D.C. district court points out that the Secretary's regulatory definition has been
consistently upheld by the courts. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 284. However, in
supporting this statement, the D.C. district court cites both the district and circuit court
opinions of Palla I and Palila I Appeal, while only citing the circuit court opinion of Palila
IL Id. This would suggest that, when confronted with the Chapter's nocitur a sociis
argument, infra notes 258-61, this court was troubled by the dicta in the Palila II district
court decision.
189. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 284.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 285.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 285 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983)). In Kolender, the United States Supreme Court described the so-called "void for
vagueness" doctrine as requiring "that a penal statute define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
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criminal statute must provide citizens with actual notice of prohibited
conduct.195 This claim by the Chapter was also unsuccessful.1 96
Understandably, the Chapter made no allegations that they were
actually threatened with any criminal enforcement or prosecution pursuant
to this regulation, instead raising a purely facial constitutional challenge to
this regulation.197 The Secretary successfully argued that the plaintiffs'
facial challenge must fail because the regulation implicated no constitution-
ally protected conduct unless the Chapter could demonstrate that the
regulatory definition was impermissibly vague in all of its applications. 98
The Chapter could prove neither, despite shopworn claims that their Fifth
Amendment property rights amounted to such constitutionally protected
conduct. 199
Applying the regulation to the facts, the district court in Sweet Home
I found the criminal conduct was defined with adequate certainty to pass
constitutional muster." ° The court observed that the definition of "harm"
was limited to habitat degradation that "actually kills or injures wild-
life." '' Moreover, habitat modifications could only result in a chargeable
"taking" if they were shown to be "significant." '  "Significant habitat
modification or degradation" was, in turn, defined as modifications that
"'actually kill or injure wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."' 3  A
determination of whether or not this regulation was violated necessitated an
evaluation of three factors: the species involved, the nature and degree of
the habitat degradation, and the needs of that particular species."0' The
court considered that these factors were readily ascertainable in determining




199. Id. (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 494 (1982)). The Chapter insisted that the Secretary's regulatory definition of "harm"
implicated their private property rights under the Fifth Amendment, and, therefore, they need
not prove the regulation impermissibly vague in all its applications under Flipside. However,
the district court in Sweet Home I agreed with the defendants' argument that "constitutionally
protected conduct" as used in Flipside denoted First Amendment rights--not Fifth
Amendment property rights. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 285. Accordingly, the plaintiffs'
attempts to avoid the Flipside standard for facial challenges was rejected by the court. Id.
200. Id. at 286.
201. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1992)).
202. Id.
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whether section 9 has been violated." 5 The court was convinced that the
regulatory definition provided more than minimal guidelines and was
adequate notice of unlawful conduct.2"
Finally, the district court placed considerable reliance on the fact that
section 9 violations must be knowingly committed. 7 The court opined
that the government would be required to demonstrate the requisite mental
state necessary before obtaining a conviction under this provision.0 8 In
this manner, the district court concluded that the Secretary's regulatory
definition was not fatally vague.2"
The Chapter also attacked the Secretary's blanket regulation which
extended the "taking" prohibition to those species listed as "threatened"
under the Act. As previously discussed, section 9 differentiates between
threatened species and endangered species, explicitly affording protection
only to the endangered species.210 The extension of section 9 protection
to threatened species is accomplished via regulations promulgated by the
Secretary pursuant to authority granted under section 4(d) of the ESA:
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary shall issue such regulations
as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of
such species. The Secretary may, by regulation prohibit with respect to
any threatened species any act prohibited under [section 9(a)] .... 211
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary extended section 9(a)(1) protection
to threatened species of wildlife by means of a single, blanket regula-
tion.7 2
The Chapter opposed this blanket regulation, contending that section
4(d) mandated the adoption of regulations on a species-by-species basis.213
Moreover, the Chapter insisted that rulemaking under this provision could
205. Id.
206. Id. The Chapter also acknowledged the Service's common practice of informing
landowners that their proposed activity would lead to a "taking," thus putting the individual
on notice for the purposes of "knowing" violations of § 9. Brief for Respondents at 4 n.5,
Babbit (No. 94-859).
207. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 286.
208. Id.; see United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988).
209. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 286.
210. See supra note I1 and accompanying text.
211. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994).
212. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
213. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 286.
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only proceed upon specific determinations by the Secretary that such
regulations are "necessary and advisable." 14 Since no such finding was
evident, the Chapter argued that the Secretary's regulation contravened
section 4(d) of the ESA.215
The court rejected this interpretation as entirely inconsistent with the
"clear and unequivocal" language of the statute.216 Section 4(d) authorizes
the Secretary to prohibit by regulation "with respect to any threatened
species any act prohibited under [section 9(a)(1)]."217  Congress' use of
the word "any" throughout section 4(d) provided this clear intent: "The
word "any" encompasses the entire range of threatened species and
prohibited acts which the Secretary might consider. It allows the Secretary
to prohibit one act with respect to one threatened species or as many as all
acts with respect to all threatened species. 2  Nothing in the language or
the legislative history of the ESA required the Secretary to promulgate these
regulations on a species-by-species basis.219 Section 4(d) admits of broad
discretion permitting the Secretary to issue regulations whenever he deems
it "necessary and advisable" to do so.2'
The district court dismissed the Chapter's theory that section 4(d)
requires the Secretary to make findings that a particular regulation is
"necessary and advisable. 2 1 Section 4(d) of the Act, the court declared,
requires the Secretary to issue regulations, not findings. ' Thus, all three
counts of the Chapter's complaint were rejected by the district court in




216. Id. The Sweet Home I court relies on Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp.,
933 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for the proposition that a court's decision may rest
solely on the words of a statute where the statute is clear and unequivocal on its face. Sweet
Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 286.
217. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 286 (quoting Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 16, 87 Stat. at
903 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994)) (emphasis added).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 286-87. As the court notes, the legislative intent, as evidenced by the Senate
report, was for a more sweeping use of the Secretary's regulatory power under § 4(d). See
id. at 287 (construing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2996).
220. Id. at 287.
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H. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Babbit-The Tortuous Journey Through the Circuit Court
An appeal was immediately taken by the Chapter, initiating the first of
three appellate decisions issued in the Sweet Home litigation.224 Since the
issues appealed were allegations of legal error, the district court's judgment
was scrutinized de novo.z" In an opinion by Chief Circuit Judge Mikva,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the
district court's decisions regarding the constitutional "void for vagueness"
challenge to the "harm" regulation and the statutory challenge to the
Secretary's blanket regulation extending section 9 protection to threatened
species. 26 As for the statutory attack on the "harm" regulation, the
appellate court upheld the definition per curiam." 7
First, the panel affirmed the district court's disposition of the "void for
vagueness" attack on the "harm" regulation. 228  The Chapter urged the
court to resolve the alleged vagueness problem in one of two ways: 1) by
interpreting "harm" in a much more limiting manner, finding harm only
upon proof of an intentionally inflicted physical injury to an individual
member of a listed species of wildlife, or 2) by striking down the "harm"
regulation in its entirety, should the limiting construction not be possi-
ble.229
The circuit court declined to grant either of the Chapter's requests on
this matter.23 Like the district court before it, the circuit court was unable
to find the regulation impermissibly vague in all of its applications, as
required by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside.23' This finding was necessary since the
Chapter was asserting a facial "void for vagueness" challenge to the
regulation.232
224. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbit (Sweet Home II),
1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993). This is the first of no less than three opinions issued by the
circuit court of appeals on the Sweet Home decision. See also Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbit (Sweet Home IV), 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(providing history of this litigation in circuit court).
225. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 3.
226. Id. at 2.
227. Id. at 3.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 4.
230. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 5.
231. See 455 U.S. 489, 497.
232. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 4.
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Arguing against the circuit court's application of the Flipside standard,
the Chapter insisted that this regulation impinged upon "constitutionally
protected conduct," again trying to assert their Fifth Amendment property
rights.233  The Chapter claimed that this "constitutionally protected
conduct" fell under an exception to the Flipside rule and, consequently, they
were not required to establish that the regulation was impermissibly vague
in all of its applications." The circuit court was unimpressed. While not
stating precisely of what "constitutionally protected conduct" consisted, the
panel was confident that the Supreme Court was referring to First Amend-
ment freedoms, which have long received special protection under the "void
for vagueness" doctrine.235 Economic activity, such as that raised by the
Chapter, has traditionally been given less protection under the vagueness
doctrine.236 The court dismissed the "void for vagueness" claim, holding
the Chapter's showing that the regulation would be impermissibly vague in
some hypothetical application was insufficient to meet the standard for pre-
enforcement facial attacks under Flipside.237
Having disposed of the constitutional claim, the appellate court focused
on the statutory challenge to the Secretary's rulemaking power under section
4(d).23 Insisting that the Secretary interpreted this provision in reverse,
the Chapter argued that in enacting section 4(d), Congress intended these
protections to extend to threatened species only on a species-by-species basis
and only upon an explicit finding that such rulemaking was "necessary and
advisable." '239
Consistent with the district court, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeal applied the Chevron doctrine in reviewing the Secretary's
interpretation of section 4(d).240 Contrary to the district court, however,
the appellate court found no "clear and unequivocal" intent in section 4(d);
instead, it found great difficulty divining Congress' true intent from either
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)).
236. Id. (citing Flipside, 455 U.S. at 497).
237. Sweet Home II, I F.3d at 4.
238. Pursuant to authority vested by Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 16, 87 Stat. at 903 (current
version at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d)), the Department of Interior and the Fish and Wildlife Service
have erected a regulatory framework by which protections normally reserved for endangered
species have been extended to include threatened species by a blanket rule. These
protections, in turn, may only be withdrawn by special rule, and even then, only for
particular species. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(c).
239. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 5-6.
240. Id. at 6.
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the statute or its legislative history.241 The Chapter referred the court to
specific language in the statute and its legislative history supporting its
position.242  However, the court found these passages in the legislative
history conflicting, inconsistent, and generally unclear.243
241. Id. In applying Chevron to the Secretary's regulations in § 17.31(a), the District
of Columbia Circuit reasoned:
As was the case with the "harm" regulation, there is no clear indication that §
17.31(a) violates the intent of the ESA. The statute does not unambiguously
compel the agency to expand regulatory protection for threatened species only
by promulgating regulations that are specific to individual species. In light of
the substantial deference we thus owe the agency under the principles of
Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc ... we uphold
the challenged regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Id. (citation omitted).
242. Id. Both the Chapter and the Secretary directed the appellate court to specific
passages found in the ESA's legislative history. The crux of the debate centered around the
use of singular or plural language in referring to threatened wildlife within the context of the
Secretary's regulatory power under § 4(e). First, the Chapter pointed to the Senate Report
on the Act and its § 4(e) delegation of authority to the Secretary:
[The section] requires the Secretary, once he has listed a species of fish or
wildlife as a threatened species, to issue regulations to protect that species.
Among other protective measures available, he may make any or all of the acts
and conduct defined as "prohibited acts" . . . as to "endangered species" also
prohibited acts as to the particular threatened species.
Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 6 (citing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2996). However, the government countered with legislative history of its
own:
The Secretary is authorized to issue appropriate regulations to protect endangered
or threatened species; he may also make specifically applicable any of the
prohibitions with regard to threatened species that have been listed in section
9(a) as are prohibited with regard to endangered species. Once an animal is on
the threatened list, the Secretary has almost an infinite number of options
available to him with regard to the permitted activities for those species. He
may, for example, permit taking, but not importation of such species, or he may
choose to forbid both taking and importation by not allowing the transportation
of such species.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 154, at 12) (alteration in original).
243. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Chapter's
argument, pointing out that the legislative history is simply too ambiguous to support its
conclusions. Where the passage from the Senate report does indeed refer to the threatened
species in the singular, the House of Representatives report offered by the Government uses
plural language. Accordingly, the district court concluded that: "The possible conflict
between the two reports, as well as the apparent inconsistency with the above-quoted
paragraph itself as to singular and plural, shows the perils of attempting to use ambiguous
legislative history to clarify ambiguous words within statutes." Id.
[Vol. 20
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The inescapable fact recognized by the panel was that Congress, in
drafting section 4(d), simply did not speak directly on this issue.2' In the
face of this ambiguity, the administrative agency tasked with implementing
this provision is authorized to fill in the legislative scheme, formulating its
own procedural strategy in lieu of clear legislative directives.245 Since the
Secretary's interpretation, extending section 9 to cover threatened species via
a blanket rule, did not clearly contravene section 4(d), the deference
afforded to the agency's interpretation under Chevron counseled upholding
the regulation.246
The Chapter's claim that an explicit finding of "necessary and
appropriate" was required prior to section 4(d) rulemaking was also
rejected.247 In opposition to this claim an alternate interpretation of
section 4(d) was offered. Section 4(d), as construed by the Secretary,
consists of two distinct grants of power.4  The first authorizes the
Secretary to issue regulations for the conservation of threatened species as
she deems it "necessary and advisable" to do so.249 The second grant of
authority permits her to prohibit via regulation, with respect to any
threatened species, any act prohibited under section 9(a)(1).' Under this
construction, only the former grant of authority is conditioned upon any
explicit "necessary and appropriate" finding by the Secretary. Recognizing
the relative ambiguity of Congress' intent in section 4(d), the panel deferred
to the Secretary's interpretation since it was not clearly in violation of this
ambiguous provision.25'
In any event, the court concluded that the Chapter has imparted an inappropriate
amount of significance to the use of the single as opposed to the plural. Even assuming the
Chapter is correct, and the term "species" as found in § 4(d) is singular, the court reasoned
that this still would not clearly forbid what the Secretary had done. Since Chevron calls for
deference in such a circumstance, the Chapter's arguments fall short of the mark. Sweet
Home II, I F.3d at 6.
244. Id. at 7. The court notes that "regardless of the use of the singular and plyral terms
in the statute, § 1533(d) simply does not speak directly to the question of whether the [Fish
and Wildlife Service] must promulgate protections species-by-species or may extend such
protection in a single rulemaking." Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987)).
247. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 7.
248. Id. at 7-8; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
249. Sweet Home II, I F.3d at 8 (citing Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 16, 87 Stat. at 903
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It was, however, the statutory challenge to the regulatory definition of
"harm" that received the most attention by the court. As stated above, the
district court's findings on the propriety of this regulation were affirmed per
curiam, and without comment on the matter.5 2 Two separate concurrenc-
es and a single dissenting opinion were also filed, each examining the
regulation in detail.253
Most significantly, the Chapter again deemed the expansive definition
of "harm" improperly broad in light of the more narrow terms that
accompany "harm" in the "take" definition.2' None of the other terms
found in the "take" definition extended to land use activities indirectly
injuring wildlife. Rather, the other "take" terms like "harass," "hunt,"
"trap," "kill," or "pursue" all involved the direct application of physical
force to the animal. 55 This principle of statutory construction, known as
nocitur a sociis, demands that a general term appearing in a list not be given
an overly expansive interpretation in light of the other terms that accompany
it.216 Thus, a term is properly defined by "the company it keeps." '57
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Circuit Judge Mikva rejected
the Chapter's nocitur a sociis argument. The Chief Judge observed that
other terms in the "take" definition, namely "harass," may be expanded in
a manner limiting the use of private property.258 Judge Mikva also found
252. See id.
253. On the question of the Chapter's statutory challenge to the regulatory definition of
"harm," the District of Columbia Circuit Court upheld the regulation per curiam with two
concurrences by Chief Circuit Judge Mikva and Judge Williams, while Judge Sentelle
dissented as to this portion of the opinion. Id. at 8-13.
254. See Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 10-11 (Mikva, C.J. and Williams, J., concurring
separately).
255. See id. at 10.
256. Id. (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
257. Id.
258. Id. In dismissing this argument, the Chief Judge reasoned that: "Despite
appellants' suggestions, however, the other prohibitions can limit a private landowner's use
of land in a rather broad manner. In particular, the prohibition against "harassment" can be
used to suppress activities that are in no way intended to injure an endangered species."
Sweet Home II, I F.3d at 10.
Chief Judge Mikva bolstered his position by pointing to a House of Representatives
Report considering the "take" definition which "includes harassment, whether intentional or
not. This would allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the activities of
birdwatchers where the effect of those activities might disturb the birds and make it difficult
for them to hatch or raise their young." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 154, at
11).
Indeed, Judge Mikva, in supporting his contention, points out that the definition of
"harass" is nearly as broad as the definition of "harm," and yet, this definition has not been
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strong support for his position from Congress' inclusion of "incidental take"
exceptions in the 1982 amendments. 2 9
In a separate concurrence, Judge Williams focused exclusively on the
nocitur a sociis doctrine, finding the Chapter's claim much more persu asive
than did Judge Mikva.26 Judge Williams, while nearly willing to concede
to this argument, nevertheless upheld the regulation as valid solely on the
basis of the 1982 amendments to the ESA.26' By allowing permits for the
"incidental taking" of endangered species, Congress was implicitly admitting
that such indirect takings were otherwise prohibited under section 9. But for
this amendment, Judge Williams was fully prepared to join in Judge
Sentelle's dissenting opinion, accepting the Chapter's nocitur a sociis
analysis.
In his dissent, Judge Sentelle did accept this theory and called for the
invalidation of the "harm" regulation.262 Judge Sentelle likened the
Secretary's reading of "harm" to an overzealous enforcement of a "No
Smoking" ordinance:
In my view, the fact that the farmer may be indirectly harming wildlife,
and that the statutory definition includes "harn" helps the agency's
cause but little. To analogize again to the smoking proposition, if
Congress authorized the erection of "No Smoking" signs in public
buildings and thereafter defined smoking to "include lighting, burning,
puffing, inhaling, and otherwise harmfully employing the noxious
nicotine-bearing tobacco products," some zealous bureau might well
attempt to define smoking to include chewing and spitting under the
rubric of "harmful use" in Congress' definition of smoking.... I do
not think those creative regulators would be thinking reasonably if they
should do so, nor do I think the regulators act reasonably in the present
case.
263
Judge Sentelle further based his decision on the notion that "harm" as
defined violated the canon of statutory construction that directs a court to
challenged. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 11 (Williams, J., concurring).
261. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 11. Judge Williams began his concurrence by stating:
"I agree that the 'harm' regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3, complies with the Endangered Species
Act-but only because of the 1982 amendments to the ESA." Id.
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presume the statute to read in a manner that avoids "surplusage." 264 While
"harm" may be defined to include any "act which actually kills wildlife,"
including habitat modification, this definition, in Judge Sentelle's opinion,
renders the other terms found in the "take" definition mere surplusage, since
they all cover acts which actually kill wildlife.265
In Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbit
(Sweet Home III), the Chapter petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeal for rehearing on the validity of the regulatory "harm"
definition.26 Without the benefit of further oral argument or additional
briefs, the circuit court per Judge Williams granted the Chapter's petition for
rehearing solely on the statutory challenge to the "harm" regulation.267
Judge Sentelle's opinion prevailed on rehearing, and the decision was
partially modified, holding the regulation invalid.268
The Secretary repeatedly argued that the Act, as originally adopted,
supported this expansive reading of "harm" within the context of the "take"
definition. In the alternative, the government pointed to the 1982 Amend-
ments to the ESA and the inclusion of "incidental take" permits as evidence
of Congress' implicit ratification of this definition. Neither contention was
successful.
69
Writing for the panel, Judge Williams immediately recognized as
indisputable the inherent breadth of the term "harm. 270 The United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council was
cited as an illustration of the potential for an overly-broad reading of the
term.271 In Lucas, the Court, per Justice Scalia, engaged in a mental
exercise attempting to discern the line between those regulations that
actually prevent harm as opposed to merely conferring a benefit. 2  As a
264. Id. at 13.
265. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 13.
266. 17 F.3d 1463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
267. Id.
268. Id. However, Chief Judge Mikva criticized the majority for granting this rehearing
and for its reversal without the benefit of additional briefs or oral argument tailored to this
single issue. Id. at 1473.
269. Id. at 1464.
270. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1464.
271. Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
272. Too often, this "harm prevention" rationale is used to confer benefits upon the
public at large in the guise of preventing use of private property that is noxious to adjacent
property owners. Any given restraint may well be seen by some as mitigating a "harm" to
the adjacent parcels or securing a benefit for them, depending on how the restraint is
perceived and the importance of the use evaluated. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27 (citing
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matter of pure linguistic possibility, Judge Williams pointed to Lucas for the
proposition that the withholding of a benefit may easily be recast into the
infliction of a harm:
In one sense of the word, we "harm" the people of Somalia to the
extent that we refrain from providing humanitarian aid, and we harm the
people of Bosnia to the extent that we fail to stop "ethnic cleansing."
By the same token, it is linguistically possible to read "harm" as
referring to a landowner's withholding of the benefits of a habitat that
is beneficial to a species. A farmer who harvests crops or trees on
which a species may depend harms it in the sense of withdrawing a
benefit; if the benefit withdrawn be important, then the Service's
regulation sweeps up the farmer's decision. 3
The panel's use of dicta extracted from Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion to
fashion an interpretation of "harm" under the ESA suffers from changing
context. The distinction between "benefit conferring" and "harm prevent-
ing" is a reference to the proper scope of the state's exercise of its inherent
authority under the police power.274 However, the case at bar involved the
interpretation of a federal statute by an administrative agency. No police
power concerns of the type dealt with in Lucas were implicated.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Judge Williams perceived a need to
limit the interpretation of "harm" and guard against its apparent propensity
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 49 (1964)).
273. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1464-65.
274. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024. The "prevention of harmful use" was merely an earlier
statement of the police power justification necessary to sustain the regulation of the use of
property in order to prevent the noxious use of private property: "One could say that
imposing a servitude on Lucas' land is necessary in order to prevent his use of it from
'harming' South Carolina's ecological resources; or instead, in order to achieve the benefits
of an ecological preserve." Id. Judge Williams, in his analysis, has very likely seized upon
language found in footnote 11 of the Lucas opinion:
In the present case, in fact, some of the "[South Carolina] legislature's
'findings"' to which the South Carolina Supreme Court purported to defer in
characterizing the purpose of the Act as "harm preventing," seem to us phrased
in "benefit conferring" language instead. For example, they describe the
importance of a construction ban in enhancing "South Carolina's annual tourism
industry revenue," in "providing habitat for numerous species of plants and
animals, several of which are threatened or endangered," and in "providing a
natural healthy environment for the citizens of South Carolina to spend leisure
time which serves their physical and mental well being ...
Id. at 1024 n. 11 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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for misuse. This was accomplished by reading "harm" in light of the other
terms that accompany it in the definition of "take" under section 9:
The immediate context of the word ["harm"], however, argues strongly
against any such broad reading. With the single exception of the word
"harm," the words of the definition contemplate the perpetrator's direct
application of force against the animal taken: "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect." The forbidden acts
fit, in ordinary language, the basic model "A hit B." 275
Any term that extends "take" beyond the direct application of physical force
to the animal taken, in the panel's view, exceeds Congress' intentions. This
includes the words "harm" and "harass. 276
Judge Williams reasoned that all of the terms found in the "take"
definition contemplate the direct application of physical force, though this
force need not be exerted by a bullet or a blade. 77 Some of the terms like
"pursue" do not actually result in injury, capture, or death, but are
nevertheless included by reason of the definition's reference to "attempted
takings. 278 Others, like "trap," may occur through the planned release of
physical force upon the animal at a future time, even in the absence of the
271perpetrator.  Still, all instances of "taking" a species involve the applica-
tion of physical force under the panel's view.
In the prior appellate decision, Judge Mikva had dismissed this
argument relying on the term "harass."28 Since another term in the "take"
definition could encompass activities lacking any direct application of
physical force, Judge Mikva determined that "harm" was not drawn in
275. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1465.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. Recall that the definition of "take" includes "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 16, 87 Stat. at 903 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19))
(emphasis added).
279. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1465.
280. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 10. In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Mikva
dismissed the Chapter's nocitur a sociis claim noting that "[d]espite appellants' suggestions,
however, the other prohibitions can limit a private landowner's use of his land in a rather
broad manner. In particular, the prohibition against "harassment" can be used to suppress
activities that are in no way intended to injure an endangered species." Id. Judge Mikva
went on to quote the Secretary's definition of harass, illustrating the similarities between the
definition of "harass" and that of "harm." Id.
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impermissibly broad terms.2 ' This earlier statement was contradicted by
Judge Williams who concluded that "harass" also involved physical force
directed at the individual animal." 2 For example, aiming light or sound
at an animal may constitute "harassment." This, too, is a physical force
under the panel's analysis, as the particles and waves that comprise the light
and sound constitute physical forces being propelled at the animal by the
perpetrator.
83
Judge Williams, in supporting his narrow construction of "harass," also
referred to the restrictive meaning of the term as used in the Marine
Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA").214 In United States v. Hayashi,2 5
the perpetrator was prosecuted and convicted for "taking" a marine mammal
in violation of the MMPA.28 ' Hayashi allegedly "harassed" a pod of
porpoises by firing a rifle twice into the water behind the animals. 287 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, using a nocitur a sociis argument, ascribed
a much more restrictive meaning to "harass" under the MMPA's prohibition
against "takings":
The statute groups "harass" with "hunt," "capture," and "kill" as forms
of prohibited "taking[s]." The latter three each involve direct, sustained,
and significant intrusions upon the normal, life-sustaining activities of
a marine mammal; killing is a direct and permanent intrusion, while
hunting and capturing cause significant disruptions of a marine
281. Id.
282. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1465.
283. Id.
284. Id. The MMPA includes an "anti-take" provision:
There shall be a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals
and marine mammal products, commencing on the effective date of this chapter,
during which time no permit may be issued for the taking of any marine
mammal and no marine mammal or marine mammal product may be imported
into the United States ....
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1994). The MMPA in turn states that "[t]he term 'take' means to
harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill any marine mammal."
Id. § 1362(13) (1994).
285. 5 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1993).
286. Id. at 1279. An April 22, 1991 information charged Hayashi with knowingly
taking a marine mammal in violation of the MMPA, and Hayashi was subsequently convicted
by a district court judge in July of that same year. See id. (providing a recount of the
proceedings below).
287. Hayashi and his son, commercial tuna fishermen in Hawaii, were retrieving their
catch when a pod of porpoises began to eat the captured tuna before they could be landed.
Hoping to frighten the porpoises away from their catch, Hayashi fired two rifle shots into the
water behind the animals. The shots did not hit the porpoises. Id.
1996]
49
Plante and Baumann: Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon: P
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
mammal's natural state. Consistent with these other terms, "harass-
ment" to constitute a "taking" under the MMPA, must entail a similar
level of direct and sustained intrusion.
88
Like the term "harass" as used in the MMPA, the ESA's definition of "take"
similarly aligns "harass" with other verbs lacking in the concept of habitat
modification that all involve direct applications of force.289
The use of the MMPA in the panel's decision is problematic for two
reasons. First, Hayashi was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals-the very same court that decided the Palila cases. It would be
logical to conclude that the appellate court saw something in the ESA that
was not present in the MMPA. Nowhere in Hayashi was Palila ever
questioned or reversed, Hayashi certainly cannot stand for that proposi-
tion.2" Nevertheless, Hayashi has been used in precisely this manner by
directly questioning the interpretation of the ESA in Palila.
More significantly, there is a substantial difference between the MMPA
and the ESA. The MMPA is almost devoid of the congressional concerns
for habitat loss that predominates the ESA.29' The exigencies leading to
the adoption of the two statutes are highly dissimilar. Congress, in enacting
the ESA, ranked habitat loss or degradation as the primary cause of the
extinction crisis.292 Yet, the predominant threat to marine mammals
288. Id. at 1282 (relying on Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312,
322 (1977)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applies the "familiar principle" that words
grouped together in a list should be given related meaning. Hayashi, 5 F.3d at 1282.
289. See Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1465.
290. Nowhere in either the majority opinion or the dissent in Hayashi does the Palila
line of cases even earn mention. However, many of the same arguments found in Sweet
Home V are presented in the Hayashi opinion. See generally Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities for a Great Or. (Sweet Home V), 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
291. In contrast to the prominent position occupied by habitat in Congress' findings in
the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b), the MMPA contains only the following broad congressional
finding:
(2) such species and population stocks should not be permitted to diminish
beyond the point at which they cease to be a significant functioning element in
the ecosystem of which they are a part, and, consistent with this major objective,
they should not be permitted to diminish below their optimum sustainable
population. Further measures should be immediately taken to replenish any
species or population stock which has already diminished below that population.
In particular, efforts should be made to protect essential habitats including the
rookeries, mating grounds, and areas of similar significance for each species of
marine mammal from the adverse effect of man's actions....
16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (1994).
292. See supra note 20.
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addressed by the MMPA was the hunting, capture, and commerce in those
species.293 Indeed, Congress, in enacting the MMPA, has arguably left
habitat protection concerns to the states.294
In spite of these issues, Judge Williams was able to circumvent Judge
Mikva's previous opinion, isolating "harm" from the rest of the terms
defining "take." '295 Judge Williams concluded that the word is indeed
drawn in impermissibly broad terms, deeming the application of nocitur a
sociis necessary to avoid giving the term "harm" a breadth unintended by
Congress. 6 Judge Williams, in turn, denounced the Secretary's construc-
tion of the "take" definition and its inclusion of habitat modification as a
form of harm. 297 He also adopted the Chapter's previously rejected claim
that Congress intended to address the habitat problem on private property
through habitat acquisition and not through the prohibitions of section 9.291
This construction of the Act, in his view, reflected Congress' desire to place
the primary duty of conserving habitat with the federal government. 2 99
Thus, the Secretary's reading contravened this objective by assigning the
duty to preserve habitat to private landowners. 3"
Regarding the effect of the 1982 Amendments to the ESA, Judge
Williams repudiated his former concurring opinion, holding that the
293. The MMPA is replete with provisions regarding the harvest and commerce of
marine mammals and marine mammal products, while otherwise remaining silent on habitat
concerns. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1406 (1994).
294. In discussing the scope of the MMPA's federal preemption of state law, the House
issued the following explanation:
[Subsection (b)] authorizes the Secretary [of Commerce] to develop effective
working cooperative arrangements with state agencies and officials in order to
carry out the purposes of this Act. It is not the intention of this Committee to
foreclose effective state programs and protective measures such as sanctuaries;
it is rather our intention to allow development of a unified integrated system of
management for the benefit of these animals and to encourage the states to take
all actions which are consistent with this objective.
H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1971), microformed on CIS No. 71-H563-25
(Congressional Info. Serv.) (emphasis added).
295. Judge Mikva's disagreement with the Chapter's nocitur a sociis argument relies
heavily on his conclusion that "harm" is not the only term in the "take" definition applying
§ 9 to habitat modification and other indirect impacts. Sweet Home 11, 1 F.3d at 10.
296. Sweet Home I1, 17 F.3d at 1465-66.
297. Id. at 1466.
298. Id. Judge Williams recognizes that the ESA addresses habitat preservation in two
ways-through the federal land acquisition program of § 5 and through the § 7(a)(2) directive
to federal agencies to avoid adverse impacts. Id.
299. Id. at 1466.
300. Sweet Home 111, 17 F.3d at 1466.
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inclusion of so-called "incidental take" permits, in amending section 10(a),
could not stand for the proposition that Congress had ratified the broad
reading of section 9, as advocated by Palila and by the Secretary's
regulation."' Newly added section 10(a)(1)(B) of the ESA authorized the
FWS to issue permits for "any taking otherwise prohibited" by section 9, if
such taking is incidental to an otherwise lawful purpose.3°  It did not
follow, Judge Williams reasoned, that such incidental takings included
habitat modifications.
30 3
An incensed Chief Circuit Judge Mikva denounced the panel's opinion,
reasoning, and effect:
The majority decision in this case is unfortunate. It scuttles a carefully
conceived Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") regulation and creates a
split in the circuits on an important statutory question.... What was
301. Id. at 1467. Judge Williams recognizes two possible implications resulting from
the 1982 amendments and ultimately rejects both:
First, one might argue that one of the amendments so altered the context of the
definition of "take" so as to render the Service's interpretation reasonable, or
even, conceivable, to reflect express congressional adoption of that view.
Second, one might argue that the process of amendment, which brought the
Service's regulation and a judicial endorsement to the attention of a congressio-
nal subcommittee, constituted a ratification of the regulation. We reject both
theories.
Id.
302. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 16, 87 Stat. at 903 (current version at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(1)(B)).
303. Id. Judge Williams rebuts previous claims that the 1982 amendments served as a
ratification of Palila and the Secretary's regulation by focusing on the House Conference
Reports relied upon by the Government in the principle case, and by the district court below:
This provision is modeled after a habitat conservation plan that has been
developed by three Northern California cities, the County of San Mateo, and
private landowners and developers to provide for the conservation of the habitat
of three endangered species and other unlisted species of concern within the San
Bruno Mountain area of San Mateo County.
This provision will measurably reduce conflicts under the Act and will
provide the institutional framework to permit cooperation between the public and
private sectors in the interest of endangered species and habitat conservation.
The terms of this provision require a unique partnership between the public
and private sectors in the interest of species and habitat conservation. ...
Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1468 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
30-31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2871-72). The focus in these reports,
reasoned Judge Williams, is on the flexibility of the relief available under this new section.
However, this alone, under his view, does not imply an assumption that "takings" under §
9 encompass habitat degradation. Id.
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rightly considered good law in the opinion in this case issued last year,
... is now "altered" on the basis of a confusing and misguided legal
analysis that creates a needless conflict among the circuits. I dis-
sent.
304
In his detailed dissent, the Chief Judge's most telling criticism of the
majority opinion is what he deemed the majority's apparent decision to
"jettison" the Chevron standard.0 5 Specifically, he charged that the
majority opinion invalidated the Fish and Wildlife Services' definition
because it was neither "clearly authorized by Congress" nor a reasonable
and permissible interpretation of the Act. By shifting to the agency the
burden of defending the reasonableness of its interpretations, Judge Mikva
insisted that the panel's decision conflicted with Chevron, which defers to
agency interpretations, unless proven unreasonable or contrary to clearly
stated congressional intent. Indeed, as the Chief Judge recognized,
deference is the whole point of the Chevron standard.3 6 This position
would ultimately prevail among the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court.
In Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbit
(Sweet Home IV), the Government quickly petitioned the appellate court for
a rehearing, suggesting a rehearing en banc. 3°7 This petition was denied
on August 12, 1994.0 Over a dissent by Chief Judge Mikva and three
other circuit judges, Judge Williams, writing for the panel, denied the
petition.3' Judge Williams concluded that the Secretary's definition of
"harm" created serious overlap problems between the various provisions of
the statute.310 Specifically, section 7's prohibition against the adverse
modification of critical habitat would be entirely superseded by the
Secretary's ability to bar habitat modification under section 9.311 Judge
304. Id. at 1473 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1467.
307. 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
308. Id. at 191.
309. Chief Judge Mikva was joined by Circuit Judges Wald, Silberman, and Rogers in
dissenting from the majority's denial of the hearing en banc. Id. at 191. Silberman filed a
separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 194 (Silberman, J. dissenting).
310. Id. at 192.
311. Sweet Home IV, 30 F.3d at 192 (citing MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EvOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 397 (1977)).
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Williams also leveled criticism at the regulation's apparent inclusion of
omissions that actually kill or injure wildlife.312
I. The Circuits Split-Harsh Reactions to Sweet Home in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Chief Circuit Judge Mikva's predictions proved correct.313 Sweet
Home, as decided on rehearing, created a sharp split in position between the
District of Columbia Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, with
the latter remaining true to the Palila line of cases.
Less than a month after the final rehearing of Sweet Home, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington
Northern Railroad.314 In that case, the Ninth Circuit restated its Palila II
decision, citing to it for authority.315 Sweet Home was not mentioned.
A few months later, still in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
District Court for the Western District of Washington was asked to follow
Sweet Home in lieu of Palila J.316 This request was emphatically denied:
The argument that Sweet Home is now binding in the Ninth
Circuit, however, is incorrect. Differences among the circuits are
common, and the District of Columbia Circuit has no power to overrule
another circuit's decision....
Here, a contrary conclusion has already been reached by the court
of appeals whose rulings are binding on this court. The Palila case,
upholding the FWS regulation, is the law of the Ninth Circuit until and
unless changed by the Supreme Court or by the circuit itself.
It follows that the Secretaries did not act arbitrarily, or contrary to
law, in concluding that Sweet Home requires no change in the [Record
of Decision adopting the Management Plan]. If Palila ceases to be the
law of the circuit, either because of Supreme Court review of Sweet
312. Id. at 191.
313. In dissenting to Judge Williams' reversal of the district court on rehearing, Chief
Judge Mikva warned that the decision would create an unnecessary split in the circuits. See
Sweet Home II1, 17 F.3d at 1473 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
314. 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994). Burlington Northern involved several collisions
between threatened grizzly bears and freight trains operated by the defendants. A series of
accidental corn spills from railroad cars in northwestern Montana had attracted the bears to
the tracks where seven grizzly bears were ultimately struck and killed by trains. Id. at 1509.
315. Id. at 1512-13.
316. Seattle Audobon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1312 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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Home or otherwise, the administrative decision under review will have
to be reconsidered.317
This reaction was echoed a few months later in the Northern District
of California in Marbled Murrelet (Brachyramphus marmoratus) v. Pacific
Lumber Co. 18 The division among the federal circuits would only
deepen.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT STEPS IN-BABBIT V. SWEET HOME
CHAPTER OF COMMUNITIES FOR A GREAT OREGON
The United States Supreme Court, recognizing a growing split between
the federal circuits, granted the Secretary's petition for a writ of certiorari
and agreed to hear Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon (Sweet Home V)319 on January 6, 1995.320 The Supreme
Court reversed the District of Columbia Circuit Court in a six-to-three
vote.32 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, O'Connor,
Ginsberg, and Breyer, upheld the Secretary's regulatory definition of
"harm. ''3  Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurring opinion, and
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented.3"
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens deemed certain initial
assumptions to be appropriate in sufficiently framing the legal issue for the
Court.3' First, he assumed that the members of the Chapter had no wish
to harm either the red-cockaded woodpecker or the Northern spotted
owl.3' The various economic interests challenging this regulation only
desired a continuation of their logging activities.326 Justice Stevens
similarly assumed arguendo that these logging activities would nevertheless
have the unintended effect of injuring or killing some members of these
317. Id. at 1313.
318. 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
319. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
320. Id. at 2409.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 2418, 2421.
324. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2412. Justice Stevens attributed the propriety of these
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listed species through the degradation of their habitat. 327 He then reduced
the controversy to its essence:
Under [the Chapter's] view of the law, the Secretary's only means of
forestalling that grave result [as described above]-even when the actor
knows it is certain to occur-is to use his [section] 5 authority to
purchase the lands on which the survival of the species depends. The
Secretary, on the other hand, submits that the [section] 9 prohibition on
takings, which Congress defined to include "harm," places on respon-
dents a duty to avoid harm that habitat alteration will cause the birds
unless respondents first obtain a permit pursuant to [section] 10.328
In selecting the latter view and holding the Secretary's interpretation of
the ESA to be a reasonable one, Justice Stevens offered three principal
justifications: the ordinary understanding of the terms used in defining
"take," the ESA's broad objectives and purposes, and the 1982 Amendments
all supported the Secretary's interpretation.329
A. The Secretary's Interpretation is Supported by the Ordinary
Usage of the Word "Harm"
The Sweet Home V majority's first justification for upholding the
Secretary's "harm" regulation was based on the "ordinary understanding" of
the term. Both sides briefed the Court at length on the true meaning of
"harm" as it appears in the ESA; the majority selected the interpretation that
comported with the overall intent of the Act's purposes. The Chapter
contended that the improper breadth of the Secretary's definition was owed
in part to an abstract consideration of the term taken entirely out of context:
When read in its statutory context, "take" necessarily involves action
directed at wildlife. It thus cannot be stretched to cover the types of
ordinary land use activities of concern to Respondents, such as cutting
trees, clearing brush, or constructing or maintaining roads....
In so concluding, the court below recognized, and we concede, that
the word "harm," wrenched from its context and considered abstractly,
is a word of extraordinary elasticity, arguably capable of the meaning
FWS attributes to it.
330
327. Id.
328. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2412.
329. Id. at 2412-23.
330. Brief for Respondents at 9, Babbit (No. 94-859).
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The Chapter reasoned that, when read out of context from the rest of the
ESA "take" definition, "harm" could and was being used to prohibit any
action that might produce any type of negative impact on a listed ani-
mal.331  This, the Chapter argued, permitted the Secretary to refer to acts
or omissions that deprived wildlife of some environmental benefit, such as
a suitable habitat, as "harm" to the species.332 Moreover, the Secretary's
interpretation was not limited to activity or conduct purposefully directed at
injuring in a manner to which the term "harm" normally implies.333 Thus,
by focusing exclusively on the ultimate effect on the animal, while
simultaneously disregarding the character of the conduct prohibited under
section 9, the Chapter concluded that the regulation easily encompassed
many normal activities that are neither directed at wildlife nor cause any
concrete injury to that wildlife.3" This, the Chapter insisted, counter-
manded section 9 as written.335
Conversely, the Government argued that the Secretary's interpretation
did comport with "ordinary usage":
In ordinary usage, the word "harm" in its verb form, means "to cause
hurt or damage to: INJURE," or "to do or cause harm to: injure;
damage; hurt[.]" This common understanding of the word unquestion-
ably encompasses an act that actually "kills or injures wildlife"-the
331. In particular, the Chapter took issue with the fact that the regulation does not
demand "actual physical injury" to an identifiable animal. Id. at 8. Rather, "harm" may
consist of the impairment of essential behavioral patterns resulting from significant habitat
modification. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. Given the uncertainty in evaluating whether a particular
habitat modification will significantly impair essential behavioral patterns, the Chapter
contended that the "harm" regulation as written and as enforced by the Secretary has resulted
in an improperly pervasive land use control. See Brief for Respondents at 8 n.9, Babbit (No.
94-859).
332. Brief for Respondents at 9, Babbit (No. 94-859). This argument is, of course, the
analysis used by Judge Williams in the court below. See Sweet Home II, 17 F.3d at 1464;
see also text accompanying notes 253-57.
333. Brief for Respondents at 9, Babbit (No. 94-859). The Chapter insisted that the
term "harm" generally connotes a purposeful effort to injure:
The command, "Don't harm that child!", for example, would not naturally be
thought of as a directive to restrict the child's television-watching or candy
intake, even though either in excess would cause the child "harm." In active
voice, or in a prohibitory sense--as in ESA [§§] 3(19) and 9(a)(1)-"harm" is
commonly understood to convey a sense of purposeful effort and direct, concrete
injury.
Id.
334. Id. at 7.
335. Id.
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basic definition of "harm" in the first sentence of 50 C.F.R. [section]
17.3.336
Thus, the Government asserted that the basic definition of "harm," that
is, conduct that "actually kills or injures wildlife," is a sound one supported
by the word's ordinary usage.337 This basic definition, the Government
noted, was not what was attacked in the lower courts. Rather, the Chapter
has challenged the validity of the second sentence of the regulation, which
specifies that "harm" may include those activities that, while satisfying the
original definition by actually killing or injuring wildlife, nevertheless occur
through significant habitat modifications that impair essential behavioral
patterns such as breeding, feeding, and sheltering.338 This second sen-
tence, in the Secretary's view "merely elaborates on the basic definition in
the first sentence by explaining its application in one particular context."
339
The Secretary's view ultimately prevailed on Justice Stevens and the
majority in Sweet Home V. First, the majority adopted the Secretary's
"ordinary usage" analysis in rejecting the Chapter's assertions that "harm"
must be limited to "purposeful, direct" injury.34  Justice Stevens could
find no reference in the common definition of the word "harm" suggesting
in any way that only direct and willful action leading to injury may
constitute "harm., 34  Additionally, the holding pointed to the structure of
the ESA's "take" definition in an apparent response to the Chapter's charge
that the term's elastic definition is owed to the Secretary's attempt to read
336. Brief for Petitioners at 20-21, Babbit (No. 94-859) (citations omitted) (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1034 (1986); RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 873 (2d ed. 1987)).
337. Id. at 21.
338. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3). The Government subdivided the "harm" regulation
into two distinct components. The first component is the basic definition of "harm" as
expressed in the initial sentence of the regulation: "Harm in the definition of 'take' in the
Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). The
second component of the regulation is the explanatory sentence which comprises the
remainder of the Secretary's definition: "Such act may include significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." Id. The
Secretary contended that, given the soundness of the basic definition, this second sentence
is also valid, since it includes only those significant habitat modifications that meet the basic
definition-those that actually kill or injure wildlife. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Babbit (No.
94-859).
339. Brief for Respondents at 21, Babbit (No. 94-859).
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the term out of its context in the Act. To admit the Chapter's contentions
and limit "harm" to direct injuries only would, in the majority's opinion,
deprive the term of any independent meaning and reduce "harm" to little
more than statutory surplusage.342 The opinion concluded that a reluctance
to reach such a result supported the reasonableness of the Secretary's
interpretation.3 4u
B. The Broad Purpose of the ESA Supports the Reasonableness of
the Secretary's Interpretation of "Harm"
The second justification offered by the majority in upholding the
Secretary's interpretation as reasonable was the broad objectives Congress
apparently sought to realize through the ESA:
Second, the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's decision
to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms
Congress enacted the statute to avoid. In TVA v. Hill, we described the
Act as "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species ever enacted by any nation."' 4
Thus, the Act and its legislative history are replete with references to habitat
protection and the role played by the threat of habitat loss in the ongoing
extinction crisis.345
These sentiments echoed the Secretary's position that a contrary
interpretation of "harm," limiting the term to "physical blows to the body
of individual animals," would defeat Congress' wishes.346 Pointing to an
oft-quoted passage from the legislative history of the Act, the Secretary
pointed out that it was Congress' intent that "take" be "defined... in the
broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a
person could 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife. 347
342. Id. Unless "harm" is read to encompass indirect as well as direct injury, Justice
Stevens concluded that the word would have no meaning that is not mere duplication of the
other terms used to define "take" in § 3(19). Id.
343. Id. (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837
n.11 (1988)).
344. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2413 (citation omitted).
345. See id.
346. Brief for Petitioners at 27, Babbit (No. 94-859).
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By contrast, the Chapter insisted that the Secretary's reading of "harm"
countermanded the plain intent of Congress:
If Congress had meant "harm" to have such significance, it would have
made the operative term in the statute "harm" instead of "take"-or
found some other way to highlight ESA [section] 9's intended breadth.
Instead, Congress cast the section more narrowly, as a prohibition on
"take," and quietly placed the word "harm" in a list alongside nine other
terms in the definitional section.348
If Congress had wished to reach the use of private property through section
9's "take" provision, the Chapter vigorously asserted that "it would have
addressed the matter forthrightly. '349 Given Congress' keen awareness of
the threat of habitat loss, the absence of any explicit reference to habitat in
section 9 was a significant fact for the Chapter, for it served only to.
emphasize Congress' conscious decision to address habitat loss elsewhere
in the Act.350
The Secretary's view ultimately prevailed upon the majority in Sweet
Home V.35' Harkening back to the Court's 1978 opinion in TVA v. Hill,
the majority underscored the comprehensive nature of the Act's protective
goals:
Both our holding and the language in our opinion [in TVA v. Hill]
stressed the importance of the statutory policy. "The plain intent of
Congress in enacting this statute," we recognized, "was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is
reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every
section of the statute.
352
Section 9 was no different. Although the Court in TVA v. Hill dealt
primarily with the prohibitions of section 7, Hill took particular note of the
Secretary's inclusion of habitat degradation in its definition of "harm" under
section 9.353
The Chapter's arguments for the impermissibility of the Secretary's
definition failed to persuade the Court. The majority was instead swayed
348. Brief for Respondents at 22, Babbit (No. 94-859) (citation omitted).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 22-23.
351. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2407.
352. Id. at 2413 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)).
353. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184-85; see also supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
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by the comprehensive protection provided under the ESA, finding the
Secretary's interpretation permissible in light of this protection.
C. The 1982 Amendments to the ESA Support the
Reasonableness of the Secretary's Interpretation
Finally, the Court examined the 1982 amendments to the ESA to
bolster its reading of the Act.3- Added to the ESA in 1982, section
10(a)(1)(B) authorized the Secretary to issue permits allowing "takings"
otherwise prohibited under section 9 so long as "such taking is incidental to,
and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activi-
ty." '355 The majority stated that this additional exemption to section 9's
prohibitions, "strongly suggests that Congress understood [section]
9(a)(1)(B) to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings. 356
The Chapter contended that "incidental" take permits were designed
with inadvertent or accidental takings in mind.357 Absent such a provi-
sion, a trapper who intends to capture an unlisted species, but inadvertently
traps and injures a listed one, would be guilty of violating section 9.351
A commercial fishermen whose otherwise lawful trawl nets intended for
shrimp inadvertently ensnares an endangered sea turtle would similarly
violate section 9 without this provision.359  "Incidental" takings, as
understood by the Chapter, must only be those actions directed at unprotect-
ed wildlife, which accidentally "take" a listed species.
The Secretary's view on the true effect of the "incidental" take permit
stood at variance with the Chapter's position. As the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee Report accompanying the amendments
revealed:
[Section 10(a)] addresses the concerns of private landowners who are
faced with having otherwise lawful actions not requiring federal permits
prevented by the Section 9 prohibitions against taking.
Section 10(a), as amended, would allow the Secretary to permit
any taking otherwise prohibited by Section 9(a)(1)(B) if the taking is
354. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
355. Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 2, 96 Stat. at 1411 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a)(1)(B)). For a discussion in greater detail, see supra text accompanying notes 80-89.
356. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
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incidental to, and not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful activity. By
use of the word "incidental" the Committee intends to cover situations
in which it is known that a taking will occur if the other activity is
engaged in but such a taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
activity.'6
Thus, Congress' intentions, as construed by the Secretary, were to
encompass more than simply accidental or inadvertent violations of section
9. Instead, the Secretary was authorized to exempt certain lawful activities
from section 9 in instances where an unlawful taking was expected ahead
of time, and where such an effect could only be minimized rather than
avoided.362 Implicit in this scheme, however, is the notion that an inciden-
tal take, to every extent practical, will be minimized and remedied
immediately.363
This position was echoed by the Sweet Home V majority. By requiring
the applicant to prepare a "conservation plan" identifying how he plans to
carry forward with his proposed activity while minimizing the impact on the
affected species, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress had foreseeable
and anticipated impacts in mind when passing this provision."
The Chapter's construction of section 10(a)(1)(B)'s "incidental" take
permit is "logically" consistent with their highly limited reading of "harm"
under section 9.365 Yet, reading both constructions together, the Chapter's
position is seen as nothing more than a rationalization resting on a creative
assumption. Once permits are obtained to alter a natural area, the Chapter
insisted that no "taking" could occur so long as the activity permitted is in
compliance with the permit. Their argument assumes that any particular
pine tree in which a red-cockaded woodpecker is seen nesting, resting,
feeding, or breeding, or any other of a host of biological gerunds, will be
left undisturbed. The key point advanced was that the woodpecker was not
the target of the logging activity, and no individual woodpecker nest or
361. H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2831.
362. Brief for Petitioners at 34, Babbit (No. 94-859) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 567, supra
note 361, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2831).
363. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b).
364. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
365. Succinctly put, the Chapter reads "harm" as limited to purposeful and deliberate
actions directing physical force against a listed species. See Brief for Respondents at 9,
Babbit (No. 94-859). The Chapter's reading of "harm" is reminiscent of the intent
requirement imposed on § 9 by the Froehlke decision issued by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1976. Id. at 18 n.21.
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respite was deliberately targeted. Therefore, no individual birds were
deliberately killed. This ignores reality. The incidental take permit,
according to the Chapter's argument, is needed only in the event that an
"accident" occurs-that a good faith observation failed to reveal a wood-
pecker which, consequently, was destroyed.
The majority, according to Justice Stevens, rejected this argument as
"absurd.366 The argument is nothing more than a rationalism based on
a false premise. What the Chapter virtually willfully ignored is the known
biology of the impacted species; the animal does not live out its life
statically, sitting on just one limb, feeding in just one tree, or sheltering in
a single roost, while its habitat is destroyed.367 Populations are dynamic.
The animal has been directly "harmed," in that when the logging activities
have ended for the day, its ability to live has been directly hampered
through the impairment of essential behavior.36 The static argument fails
in the dynamic reality of the system being impacted by the otherwise
"permitted" or "lawful" activity.
Accordingly, the Chapter's insistence on narrowing section 9 to direct
and purposeful actions taken against a member of a listed species was, in the
Court's view, reduced to an "absurdity" by the inclusion of Section
10(a)(1)(B). 369  Under the Chapter's interpretation, an applicant could
request an "incidental" take permit to skirt liability under section 9 for direct
and deliberate action taken against a listed species. Yet, no one could
seriously request a permit for this bizarre purpose.370 Consequentially, the
majority perceived the need to give "real and substantial effect" to
Congress' amendments. The Chapter's reading of the 1982 amendments
was, therefore, completely rejected.
D. Flaws in the Appellate Court's Opinion
Having found the Secretary's regulation consistent with the ESA, the
Court identified three principal errors in the circuit court's opinion.371
366. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
367. This criticism was more clearly expressed by Justice O'Connor in her separate




371. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2414-15. It should remain clear that the opinion to
which the majority now refers is that issued by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals by Judge Williams upon rehearing. See Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1463.
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First, the holding rejects the circuit court's initial premise which construed
the Secretary's definition of "harm" as exceeding the scope of every other
term found in the "take" definition.372 The majority concluded that
"harass," "pursue," "wound," and "kill" all encompass conduct and impacts
that do not necessitate the direct application of physical force to the
animal.37
Elsewhere in the majority opinion, Stevens relied on the Act's
legislative history in determining the intended breadth of the definition of
"harass" was fairly expansive.374 Accordingly, the circuit court's use of
United States v. Hayashi was considered improper.375
The second error committed by the appellate court was the majority's
effort to incorporate an intent requirement directly into the terms defining
"take. 376 Indeed, the circuit court's interpretation of the "take" prohibi-
tion was somewhat reminiscent of the stringent intent requirement placed on
section 9 in Sierra Club v. Froehlke.77 Such a construction would stand
in variance with ESA section 11, under which an act which is merely
"knowing" will be enough to prove a violation. 378  Congress added
372. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2415.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 2416.
375. Id. at 2415 n.16. Justice Stevens finds the appellate court's reliance on Hayashi
misplaced. First, Hayashi dealt with a single application of the MMPA's "take" prohibition,
whereas the present litigation had been presented as a facial challenge to the Secretary's
regulation. Moreover, Hayashi construed the term "harass" under the MMPA's "take"
definition, while Sweet Home dealt with "harm," a term that does not even appear in the
MMPA's "take" provision. Finally, Hayashi was decided by the same court that decided the
Palila line of cases. Yet, "neither the Hayashi majority nor the dissent saw any need to
distinguish or even to cite Palila II." Id.
376. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2415.
377. See supra note 27. As discussed above, this specific intent requirement
countermands the clear meaning of the Act. United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044
(D. Mont. 1988). This is strikingly similar to the circuit court's conclusions in Sweet Home.
Only deliberate activities directed at the animal will suffice under this reading. See
generally Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1463.
378. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2415 (relying on Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 11, 87 Stat.
at 897-98 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a), (b) (1994)). Section 1 l(a), regarding civil
penalties, encompasses "[a]ny person who knowingly violates... any provision of this Act
...." Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 11(a), 87 Stat. at 897 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)
(1994)). Similarly, with reference to criminal penalties, § 11 (b) also applies to anyone who
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"knowingly" in place of "willfully" to make criminal violations of the Act
general rather than specific intent crimes.3
Finally, the Court concluded that the circuit court erred in applying the
nocitur a sociis doctrine in such a manner as to reduce "harm" to mere
surplusage, denying the term any independent meaning.30
The statutory context of "harm" suggests that Congress meant that term
to serve a particular function in the ESA, consistent with but distinct
from the functions of the other verbs used to define "take." The
Secretary's interpretation of "harm" to include indirectly injuring
endangered animals through habitat modifications permissibly interprets
"harm" to have a "character of its own not to be submerged by its
association." 381
This is a vindication of the views of Chief Circuit Judge Mikva who, on
rehearing, found himself in the minority on this issue.
E. Addressing the Chapter's Other Arguments
The remainder of the majority's opinion was devoted to refuting other
arguments used by the Chapter and adopted by the District of Columbia
Circuit. First, the Chapter asserted that such a broad reading of "take"
created more than minor overlaps in the statute, as the Secretary claimed,
and in fact threatened to subsume habitat protection measures found in
section 7 and section 5 if given such an expansive reading.382 The
Government, now able to limit the use of private land under the auspices of
section 9, would supposedly lack any incentive to purchase land under
section 5.33 Similarly, section 7, directing federal agencies to avoid
"jeopardizing" the continued existence of a listed species, or adversely
modifying its critical habitat would, in the Chapter's view, be swallowed up
by the prohibition against "takings" which applies to "any person," including
the federal government.3"4 The Court found neither claim persuasive:
379. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2412 n.9 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1804, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9484, 9493).
380. Id. at 2415.
381. Id. (citing Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923)).
382. Brief for Respondents at 23-25, Babbit (No. 94-859).
383. Id. at 24. Given the expansive application of § 9, the Chapter concluded that there
would be no incentive for the Service to purchase valuable habitat on private land (or
conservation easements), since the same goals could be more cheaply accomplished simply
by limiting the activities conducted on that land. Id.
384. Id. at 25.
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Purchasing habitat lands may well cost the Government less in many
circumstances than pursuing civil or criminal penalties. In addition, the
[section] 5 procedure allows for protection of habitat before the seller's
activity has harmed any endangered animal, whereas the Government
cannot enforce the [section] 9 prohibition until an animal has actually
been killed or injured. The Secretary may also find the [section] 5
authority useful for preventing modification of land that is not yet but
may in the future become habitat for an endangered or threatened
species . . . . Section 7 imposes a broad, affirmative duty to avoid
adverse habitat modifications that [section] 9 does not replicate, and
[section] 7 does not limit its admonition to habitat modification that
"actually kills or injures wildlife. 3 85
Thus, any overlap between sections 5 and 7, and section 9 was deemed
"unexceptional," and merely a reflection of the broad purposes of the Act
as acknowledged in the Hill case.386
The Chapter's analysis of the Act's legislative history was refuted by
the Sweet Home Court. The majority pointed to this history, including the
1982 amendments, as "further support" of the Secretary's permissible
interpretation of the statute.387 Congress intended "take" to be defined as
broadly as possible, and this was soundly reflected in the ESA's legislative
history. Adding the obviously broad term "harm" was a conscious decision
by Congress to "help to achieve the purposes of the bill." '388 The 1982
amendments only bolstered this reading of the Act.38 9
Thus, the ESA delegated broad administrative authority to the Secretary
to interpret and enforce the provisions of the Act, which received a
significant amount of deference by the Court.390 Accordingly, the regula-
tion was upheld and the district court's decision reinstated.
385. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2415.
386. Id. at 2415-16.
387. Id. at 2416.
388. Id. at 2416-17. In examining the legislative history of the Act, Justice Stevens
noted that a floor amendment in the Senate introducing "harm" to the bill was seen as a step
to "help to achieve the purposes of the bill." Id. at 2417 (quoting 119 CONG. REC. 25,683
(1973)).
389. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2417. The Court pointed to statements by Congress
indicating that § 10 was aimed toward the limited permitting of anticipated and foreseeable
"takes" that could not be avoided even after implementation of a habitat conservation plan.
Id.
390. Id. at 2418.
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F. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor joined the Sweet Home V majority in holding the
Secretary's "harm" regulation valid.391 However, while concurring with
the majority's basic decision, Justice O'Connor's agreement was qualified
in two important respects. First, the regulation defining "harm" must be
applied only to significant habitat modifications resulting in actual, rather
than speculative or hypothetical, death or injury to identifiable endangered
or threatened animals.3" Second, the regulation must be applied in light
of ordinary notions of proximate cause and foreseeability.393 These two
limitations were, in her view, clear on the face of the "harm" regulation, and
contrary to the views of the dissent, she found the regulation inherently
sound.3 "4 Both Justice O'Connor and the dissenters appeared to agree that
the "harm" regulation has been improperly applied in the past.395  The
essential difference between the two is in the placement of the blame for
these improper applications of section 9. The dissent, through Justice
Scalia, ascribed these instances of section 9's improper use to flaws inherent
in the Secretary's regulation itself. Justice O'Connor by contrast blamed a
wrongly decided Palila II decision for those erroneous applications of
section 9 ridiculed by the dissent.396 Indeed, she acknowledged that many
391. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
392. Id.
393. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2418.
394. Id. Justice O'Connor, unlike the dissenters, saw "no need to strike a regulation on
a facial challenge out of concern that it is susceptible of erroneous application, however, and
because there are many habitat-related circumstances in which the regulation might validly
apply . . . ." The essential difference between the concurrence and the dissent is that the
dissent found the regulation fatally flawed, while Justice O'Connor found it poorly
interpreted by the courts. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. Justice O'Connor concluded that Palila I was wrongly decided because, in her
opinion, the case failed to present any proximate cause between the grazing activities of the
sheep and actual harm to the palila. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2420. However, as she
noted:
This case, of course, [comes before the Court] as a facial challenge. [The
Court is] charged with deciding whether the regulation on its face exceeds the
agency's statutory mandate. I have identified at least one application of the
regulation (Palila 1H) that is, in my view, inconsistent with the regulation's own
limitations. That misapplication does not, however, call into question the
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circumstances of habitat degradation exist where the regulation may validly
apply.397
Justice O'Connor's initial criticism rests on the Palila II decision's
extension of the "harm" definition, which interpreted the actual death or
injury requirement to encompass not just individual animals, but injury to
the species as a whole.39 On this point, she and the dissenters are in
agreement. Admittedly, the death of an individual animal always "injures"
a population to the extent that it has been reduced in size or numbers.
Justice O'Connor opines that such an extension, as accomplished by Palila
II, is inconsistent with the regulation's actual injury or death require-
ment. 99 The Sweet Home V dissent, on the other hand, attributed this
extension to a defect inherent in the regulation itself. Seizing on the
regulation's use of the word "breeding," Justice Scalia concluded that the
regulation facially prohibits significant habitat modifications that actually kill
or injure potential or hypothetical animals. He argues that impairment of
breeding activity fails to injure any living animal; therefore, the regulation
has been improperly written if the prevention of injuries to living popula-
tions was the Service's goal.4"
However, Justice O'Connor was apparently unable to accept Justice
Scalia's reasoning that an impairment of breeding activities harms no living
animals. In her view, impairment is injury; impairment of essential physical
functions such as breeding which renders the animal biologically obsolete
amounts to actual injury under the regulation.4 °1 She concluded that
397. Id. at 2418.
398. Id.
399. Justice O'Connor observes that "the regulation is limited by its terms to actions that
actually kill or injure individual animals." Id. This is in clear variance with the Palila II
opinion which held that the regulation was properly interpreted to include habitat
modification that could drive the palila into extinction. Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii
Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila IlAppeal), 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988).
This reading of the Act was deemed consistent with the overall purposes of the ESA "to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved .... Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(5)(b), 87 Stat.
at 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)). The overall purposes of the Act were
served, held the court, because the palila's threatened ecosystem was conserved. Id. No
evidence of death to individual palila birds was produced. Moreover, the district court
explicitly held that no such proof was required to satisfy the regulation. Palila (Loxiodes
bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila I), 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077
(D. Haw. 1986).
400. See Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
401. Id. at 2419 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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interference with breeding and other essential behavioral patterns could
result in a host of actual injuries:
The regulation has clear application, for example, to significant habitat
modification that kills or physically injures animals which, because they
are in a vulnerable breeding state, do not or cannot flee or defend
themselves, or to environmental pollutants that cause an animal to suffer
physical complications during gestation. Breeding, feeding, and
sheltering are what animals do. If significant habitat modification, by
interfering with these essential behaviors, actually kills or injures an
animal protected by the Act, it causes "harm" within the meaning of the
regulation. 2
Justice O'Connor would require that a demonstrable injury to
identifiable animals be shown, and this actual injury must be distinguished
from the potential, the speculative and the hypothetical. 3  Activities
degrading an endangered species' potential habitat would be insufficient."
Similarly, the inability to produce evidence of dead or injured animals
would seem to fall short under this reading of the Secretary's regulation.4"5
Yet, both circumstances satisfied the regulation under Palila IL
Justice O'Connor directly questioned the correctness of Palila I on this
point. Injury to the species as a whole, as opposed to an individual
member, and injury to the species' recovery, have both been called into
doubt by her position on the regulation's actual death or injury requirement.
Her strict reading of the actual death or injury requirement overlooks the
plain goals of the ESA to conserve species and their ecosystems.e 6 The
Palila H court's focus on injuries to the collective species links section 9
402. Id.
403. Id. at 2418. Justice O'Connor's first qualification to the regulation was a showing
of actual death to identifiable protected animals. Id.
404. On this point, Justice O'Connor observed:
That a protected animal could have eaten the leaves of a fallen tree, or could,
perhaps, have fruitfully multiplied in its branches is not sufficient under the
regulation. Instead, as the commentary [on revising the "harm" definition]
reflects, the regulation requires demonstrable effect (i.e., actual injury or death)
on actual, individual members of the protected species.
Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2419.
405. Id.
406. The ESA's stated purpose is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide
a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species .. .
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(5)(b), 87 Stat. at 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)).
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with the stated overall purpose of the ESA.4 7 A contrary interpretation
would permit activities that frustrate this overall purpose.408 The court in
Palila II recognized this and properly placed the burden of demonstrating
actual death or injury on the plaintiffs.4" An extensive body of scientific
data pointed to one, and only one cause for this-the browsing activities of
the offending sheep. For the Palila II court, this well-founded body of
unrefuted data obviated any need to produce actual dead or starving palila
birds, but that is not to say that proof of dead animals will not suffice. The
burden of demonstrating actual death or injury may be satisfied in any
number of ways, and if empirical data is presented establishing an adverse
impact to the species, the regulation's actual death or injury requirement is
satisfied.4"' Actual injury to the palila as a species was the ultimate result
407. "The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated
policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute." Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). See ROHLF, supra note 3, at 65 (observing that Palila II
links § 9 with the ESA's overall purpose).
408. See Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila
I), 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1078 (D. Haw. 1986) (observing that continued destruction of the
forest would have driven the bird into extinction).
409. Id. at 1075, 1077.
410. The Service's comments on the 1981 amendment to the "harm" regulation support
this interpretation. Nowhere in the comments did the Service suggest that "actual death or
injury" required proof of death or injury to individual animals. The Service contended that
"[t]he final definition adds the word "actually" before the words "kills or injures" in response
to comments requesting this addition to clarify that a standard of actual, adverse effects
applies to section 9 takings." 45 Fed. Reg. 54,750 (1981) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Service responded to one comment arguing that habitat modification alone amounted to a
"taking" by noting that the commenter's objection was unclear because the examples and
discussion in the comment repeatedly referred to "injury and harmful effects on the species
which can be caused by habitat modification." Id. (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor now
asserts that the inclusion of "actually" has imposed a more stringent evidentiary requirement.
On that 'point she is correct. However, the opinion places more emphasis on the word
"actually" than the Service has intended. As the Service has noted:
The purpose of redefinition was to preclude claims of a Section 9 taking for
habitat modification alone without any attendant death or injury to the protected
wildlife. Death or injury, however, may be caused by impairment of essential
behavioral patterns which can have significant and permanent effects on a listed
species. Many commenters suggested that the word "actually" be reinserted in
the definition to bulwark the need for proven injury to a species due to a party's
actions. This has been done.
Id. at 54,748-49 (emphasis added). "Actually" was inserted to preserve a distinction between
habitat modification alone (which is not a "taking") and habitat modification that has a real
impact on the species. As Palila 11 observes, proven injury to identifiable animals is one of
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of numerous impairments of essential behavioral characteristics of its
constituent members. Similarly, that the palila were unable to increase their
numbers was a direct result of increased casualties of individual birds. This
fact frustrated the achievement of the stated goal of conserving and
recovering the palila.4 '
Justice O'Connor also determined that liability under the "harm"
regulation meust be conditioned on a showing of proximate cause and notions
of ordinary foreseeability.4" The decision on whether sections 11 and 9
erect a strict liability regime, as the dissent argued, could wait for another
time.413 Liability, strict or not, does not dispense with ordinary principles
of causation.4" 4 Justice O'Connor could not discern any intent by Con-
gress, in describing the ESA's penalties in section 11, to do away with
traditional principles of proximate causation.415 In the absence of such an
abrogation by Congress, she asserts that section 9 violations must be
established using principles of proximate causation borrowed from common
law tort.4" 6
Imposition of proximate cause principles arguably does no violence to
the "harm" regulation and, as Justice O'Connor claims, is required. Again,
pointing to the Service's inclusion of "actually," she observes that specula-
several ways in which this evidentiary burden may be accomplished. Palila II, 649 F. Supp.
at 1075.
411. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1077.
412. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2419-20.
413. Id. at 2420.
414. Id. Justice O'Connor observed that "[s]trict liability means liability without regard
to fault; it does not normally mean liability for every consequence, however remote, of one's
conduct." Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 79, at 559-60 (5th ed. 1984) (noting the "practical necessity for the restriction of
liability within some reasonable bounds" in the strict liability context)).
415. Id. at 2420. The penalties found in § 11(1) punish knowing violations of § 9. Pub.
L. No. 93-205, § 11(a), 87 Stat. at 897 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(1)).
416. Justice O'Connor pointed to Congress' silence on this issue, noting that she "would
not lightly assume that Congress, in enacting a strict liability statute that is silent on the
causation question, has dispensed with this well-entrenched principle." Sweet Home V, 115
S. Ct. at 2420 (relying on Benifiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that Congress did not intend to abrogate common law principles of proximate cause
to reach "remote and derivative" consequences under Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act)). Justice O'Connor also pointed to the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation & Liability Act ("CERCLA") as an example of a statute where Congress
specifically abrogated a causation requirement. Id. (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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tive or conjectural effects on listed species were explicitly excluded under
the regulation.417
Though proximate cause is not susceptible to a precise definition,
O'Connor concludes that, at the very least, proximate cause "injects a
foreseeability element into the statute. '418 In this manner, many of the
erroneous applications of section 9 probed by the dissent could be avoid-
ed.419 Moreover, Justice O'Connor asserts that this element was ignored
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Palila II, concluding that the case
was wrongly decided on these grounds:
Pursuant to my interpretation, Palila //-under which the Court of
Appeals held that a state agency committed a "taking" by permitting
feral sheep to eat mamane-naio seedlings that, when full-grown, might
have fed and sheltered endangered palila-was wrongly decided
according to the regulation's own terms. Destruction of the seedlings
did not proximately cause actual death or injury to identifiable birds; it
merely prevented the regeneration of the forest land not currently
inhabited by actual birds.420
However, section 9 does not deal with torts against the protected
animal. Section 9 directs the Secretary to restrict certain uses of private or
public property having an ascertainable impact on the listed species. To this
end, "actually" clearly injects an element of causation into the "harm"
regulation by stressing the critical link between habitat modification and
injury to the species.421  Nowhere has the Act suggested the use of
417. Id. Justice O'Connor concludes that "[tihe regulation, of course, does not
contradict the presumption or notion that ordinary principles of causation apply here. Indeed,
by use of the word, "actually," the regulation clearly rejects speculative or conjectural effects,
and thus, itself invokes principles of proximate causation." Id.
418. Id.
419. See Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2418.
420. Id. at 2420-21.
421. Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palla II),
649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077 (D. Haw. 1986) (holding that the redefinition "stresses the critical
link between habitat modification and injury to the species"). The causation element is found
in the plaintiffs burden to establish this link between the habitat modification and the
requisite injury to the species. The plaintiff must be able to prove the significant habitat
modification leads to the prohibited result. See, e.g., American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d
163, 166 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that no "taking" existed where the appellants "have not
shown that the hunt caused actual harm") (emphasis added).
Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992), exemplifies this point. The
district court found that no "taking" had occurred because the plaintiff could not meet its
burden under the regulation and prove that the proposed development would lead to the
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common law tort principles in establishing violations. Rather, the Secre-
tary's regulation has imposed a cause-in-fact standard of causation which
distinguishes between mere habitat modification and habitat modification
resulting in a prohibited impact on the listed species.4' This looser
standard of causation again underscores the overall intent of Congress that
the recovery of "endangered species be afforded the highest of priori-
ties."4"
G. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissented.424 Considering the Secretary's regulation an unfair conscription
of private property for national zoological use, he concluded that the
regulation contradicts the "unmistakably clear" intent of Congress.4' The
opinion grudgingly concedes to the application of the Chevron doctrine,
nevertheless reasoning that no amount of deference to the Secretary can save
the regulation.
From the outset, the dissent mischaracterized the nature of the
restrictions imposed on private landowners by the application of section
9.426 The opinion makes no consideration that restrictions under the ESA
are ordinarily not permanent. Once a species has progressed toward
recovery, land use restrictions can be re-evaluated according to the purpose
of the Act.427 Where circumstances dictate, these restrictions may be
destruction of habitat which in turn could threaten the listed species. Id. at 432. The court
concluded that "[ilt is this lack of a causal link between the [proposed] project and the
potential harm projected by the plaintiffs expert that distinguishes this case from those cases
cited by plaintiff." Id.
422. Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking Under
the Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 155, 190 (1995).
423. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
424. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia J., dissenting).
425. Id.
426. From the opening passage of the opinion, the dissent's tone echoed in inverse
condemnation. "The Court's holding that the hunting and killing prohibition [of § 9]
incidentally preserves habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial
ruin-not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to
national zoological use." Id.
427. The nature of § 9's restrictions on land use was recognized by the district court
opinion in Palila II:
The mamane forest can be expected to recover slowly when released from
the current browsing pressures. At some point in the future, the mamane on
Mauna Kea may have recovered sufficiently to support Palila beyond its current
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relaxed, and section 9 protection may be withdrawn partially or altogether
pursuant to the Secretary's rulemaking power under section 4(d).428
The dissent places the responsibility for solving this problem entirely
on the shoulders of the Secretary rather than on those parties who caused the
particular species to be listed. If landowners better recognized the need for
instituting sustainable use practices and concepts of responsible stewardship
on their own lands, and had relaxed economic and political pressures to
intensely harvest resources on public lands, the critical habitat problem
would have been significantly ameliorated. The combination of preserved
public lands and responsibly managed private property would probably have
been sufficient to substantially reduce the number of species listed by the
Secretary or would have reduced the degree of protection necessary to avert
the extinction of these animals. This point is avoided by the minority in
Sweet Home V. It can be argued that the interests which played the most
significant role in adversely affecting habitat and creating this problem are
those same interests which are now being asked to alter their practices to
allow species to recover.
Justice Scalia pointed to what he perceived to be three major failings
of the regulation.429 First, the regulation must fail in his view because of
its inadequate causation requirement. Read this way, habitat modifications
falling under this regulation, need only be the cause-in-fact of actual death
endangered population. Likewise, at some future date, the forest and the bird
population may be sufficiently stable to allow the coexistence of some mouflon
sheep with Palila. At present, however, the Endangered Species Act mandates
the protection of the Palila to the extent possible, in the hope that this bird does
not join the many other indigenous species that have disappeared from these
islands.
Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila I1), 649 F.
Supp. 1070, 1082 (D. Haw. 1986) (footnotes omitted).
428. For threatened wildlife, and for endangered wildlife downlisted to threatened status,
§ 9's "taking" prohibition is applied through a single blanket regulation. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31.
This blanket regulation was upheld below. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Or. v. Babbit (Sweet Home I/), 1 F.3d 1, 5-8 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Secretary can, when
appropriate, withdraw part or all of these protections by special rule for particular species
listed as threatened. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.40-.48 (Special Rules). Similarly, federally issued
permits may be acquired allowing the limited take of endangered or threatened wildlife under
appropriate circumstances. See Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 10, 87 Stat. at 896 (current version
at 16 U.S.C. § 1539); 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22-.23 (1994). The entire regulatory regime is
designed to allow the Secretary to exercise common sense in tailoring restrictions so as to
provide the best protection to the species in the least harsh manner, while always keeping in
mind the goal of ultimately delisting the species through these decisions.
429. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 20
74
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 8
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/8
1996] Plante /Baumann 821
or injury to wildlife.43 Any significant habitat modification producing
this prohibited result by impairing essential behavioral patterns is unlawful,
regardless of whether that result was foreseeable or intended, and regardless
of how attenuated the causation between modification and injury may
be.431 On this point, Justice Scalia disapprovingly cited Palila II as an
example of a "taking" claim resting on a highly attenuated chain of
causation.432
Second, Justice Scalia objected to the fact that the regulation is satisfied
by any act or omission resulting in actual death or injury.433 This point
430. Id. (citing Davison, supra note 422, at 190). The proper standard of causation
under the regulation has been the source of some confusion. The Service has remained silent
on the issue. The regulation's focus on the ultimate death or injury suggests a "but for" or
"substantial factor" standard of causation borrowed from tort law:
If a specific protected animal was found dead on land that was not part of
modified or degraded wildlife habitat, there would be a finding that the
modification of the wildlife habitat was a "taking" if the dead animal had used
the altered or modified habitat prior to its death and if, using the "but for" or
substantial factor test, the habitat modification was the cause in fact of the
animal's death by forcing the animal to migrate to new habitat where it died or
was killed.
Davison, supra note 423, at 191 (footnote omitted). A number of scenarios could fit this
model. The unsuitability of the new habitat into which the relocated animal is forced to
settle may precipitate its death or injury. Similarly, the introduction of foreign predators into
the habitat (as was the case in the Palila cases) or the displacement of predators into new
habitat bringing about conflict with the protected species, could also satisfy this standard.
See id. at 191 n.182.
431. Id. The Chapter asserted that the regulation's exclusive focus on the ultimate effect
(the injury) while disregarding the character of the conduct sought to be prohibited,
substantially contributed to the improperly broad interpretation of harm. Brief for
Respondents at 7, Babbit (No. 94-859). The narrow focus on the injury ignored the normal
usage of the term which requires some form of purposeful effort to hurt or injure. Sweet
Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2421.
432. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2421. The dissenting opinion provides one other
example of what it sees as the remote and tenuous chain of causation permitted under the
regulation:
To define "harm" as an act or omission that, however remotely, "actually kills
or injures" a population of wildlife through habitat modification, is to choose a
meaning that makes nonsense of the word that "harm" defines-requiring us to
accept that a farmer who tills his field and causes erosion that makes silt run into
a nearby river which depletes oxygen and thereby "impairs [the] breeding" of
protected fish, has "taken" or "attempted to take" the fish. It should take the
strongest evidence to make us believe that Congress has defined a term in a
manner repugnant to its ordinary and traditional sense.
Id. at 2423.
433. Id. at 2422.
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was clear on the face of the original "harm" regulation, which covered any
"act or omission which actually kills wildlife . . . ."3 However, the
mention of omissions was deleted from the regulation in the course of the
Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm., 435  Despite this deletion, the
Service's comments indicate that "act" is inclusive of both affirmative action
and omissions.436 The dissent apparently disagrees with the propriety of
including omissions under the regulation.437
Finally, the regulation's third inherent flaw under the dissent's analysis
was its inclusion of injuries inflicted not just on individual animals, but on
populations as well.43s Habitat modifications resulting in "harm" through
the impairment of breeding activity, he theorizes, fail to injure any living
creature.439 Only potential living animals may have been harmed by this
conduct, and similarly, only the population at large has been injured since
its future numbers may have been reduced.' 4 The dissent, while properly
understanding the regulation's scope applying to populations, misapprehends
the meaning in application within the context of the Act. Justice Scalia's
effort to limit section 9's application to individual animals runs counter to
the language and purpose of the Act.441
434. Id.
435. Id. at 2422 (relying on 46 Fed. Reg. § 54,750 (1981)).
436. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422. On the deletion of "or omission" from the
regulation in 1981, the Service attributed this change to their position that the term "act" is
inclusive of either commissions or omissions which would be prohibited by § 9. Id.
437. The exact nature of Justice Scalia's objection to this is unclear on the face of the
opinion. While attacking the regulation on its face, this particular objection appears to be
directed toward a specific interpretation of the regulation rather than the regulation itself.
438. Id. at 2422. In Justice O'Connor's concurrence, she stated that the regulation, on
its face, focused on individual animals, rather than on collective populations. See supra note
399. By contrast, Justice Scalia recognizes the appropriate scope of the regulation, but
concludes that this focus on the species as a whole is impermissible under the Act. Sweet
Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422.
439. Justice Scalia concludes that "[i]mpairment of breeding does not 'injure' living
creatures; it prevents them from propagating, thus "injuring" a population of animals which
would otherwise have maintained or increased its numbers." Id. The Secretary's official
pronouncements in the Final Redefinition of "Harm" accompanying the amendment to the
regulation confirm this reading for the dissent. See Brief for Respondents at 25, Babbit (No.
94-859).
440. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422.
441. The stated purpose of the ESA is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved[, and] to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species
...." Pub. L. No. 93-205, § (2)(b), 87 Stat. at 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b))
(emphasis added). Similarly, § 9(a)(1)(B) makes it unlawful for any person to "take any such
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Unable to find any of these three criticized features of the "harm"
regulation reflected in the language of the ESA, the dissent conducted a
historical analysis of the term "take." 442  Justice Scalia observed that
"harm" lacks legal significance independent from "take"--the only operative
term in section 9.4 When applied to animals, the dissent holds that
"take" has long since been understood to mean only the reduction of a wild
animal to human control via death or capture. This meaning of "take," the
opinion noted, "is as old as the law itself." 4  This use of the term "take"
was also consistent with the term's usage in other environmental statutes and
treaties.445 Justice Scalia considered his reading of "take" to be consistent
with the structure of section 9, covering all aspects of commercial trafficking
in endangered species and products made from such species; from the
"taking" of such species to their sale, transport, and import or export." 6
Therefore, the dissent holds that the Secretary's definition of "harm," when
read in conjunction with the term "take," must be confined within the long-
understood meaning of "take":
species within the United States .... Id. § 9(a)(1)(b), 87 Stat. at 893 (current version at
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)) (emphasis added). Nowhere in relevant part does the Act refer
to the animal in any other sense than collectively.
442. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422.
443. The dissent, rather than attempting to define harm as the Petitioners and
Respondents have done, turns to the term "take," as the only word having legal significance.
One cannot be criminally charged with "harming" a listed species-only of "taking" one.
Id.
444. Id.
445. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Pub. L. No. 101-233, § 15, 103 Stat. 1977 (1989)
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see also Agreement on the
Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, art. I, 27 U.S.T. 3918, 3921.
446. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422. Justice Scalia considers "take" in view of the
overall structure of § 9(a)(1):
The taking prohibition, in other words, is only part of the regulatory plan of §
1538(a)(1), which covers all the stages of the process by which protected wildlife
is reduced to man's dominion and made the object of profit. It is obvious that
"take" in this sense-a term of art deeply embedded in the statutory and common
law concerning wildlife-describes a class of acts (not omissions) done directly
and intentionally (not indirectly and by accident) to particular animals (not
populations of animals).
Id. at 2422 (citations omitted).
However, while the dissent's argument is logically consistent, this point still does not
cure the basic flaw in its premise: the failure to recognize that the entire Act requires
attention to populations as a whole. Section 9, as a whole, must be read in light of the
statute in which it appears.
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The tempting fallacy-which the Court commits with abandon-is to
assume that once defined, "take" loses any significance and it is only
the definition that matters. The Court treats the statute as though
Congress had directly enacted the [section] 1532(19) definition as a
self-executing prohibition, and had not enacted [section] 1538(a)(1)(B)
at all. But [section] 1538(a)(1)(B) is there, and if the terms contained
in the definitional section are susceptible of two readings, one of which
comports with the standard meaning of "take" as used in application to
wildlife, and one of which does not, an agency regulation that adopts
the latter reading is necessarily unreasonable, for it reads the defined
term "take"-the only operative term-out of the statute altogether. 47
Justice Scalia then turned his focus to "harm," read in light of the
operative term "take." Following a list of dictionary definitions of "harm,"
he observed that the more common or preferred usage of the term incorpo-
rated some idea of direct and anticipated hurt or injury." This, he
concluded, was the common thread binding together all ten descriptors in
the "take" definition found in the statute." 9 The application of force, as
Circuit Judge Williams had concluded,450 was not the point. Rather, in the
view of the dissenters, it was this common sense of affirmative conduct
intentionally directed against individual animals.
45
'
447. Id. at 2423.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbit (Sweet Home III),
17 F.3d 1463, 1464-65 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
451. The majority points out this apparent abandonment of the circuit court's "direct
application of force" argument. Recognizing the flaw in this interpretation, the dissent
instead sought to impose a limitation on § 9 based on a requirement of "'affirmative conduct
directed against a particular animal or animals."' Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2415 n.15.
Under this reading of § 9, the majority observed that conduct clearly in violation of the Act
would otherwise be permitted:
Under the dissent's interpretation of the Act, a developer could drain a pond,
knowing that the act would extinguish an endangered species of turtles, without
even proposing a conservation plan or applying for a permit under § 9(a)(1)(B);
unless the developer was motivated by a desire "to get at a turtle," no statutory
taking could occur. Because such conduct would not constitute a taking at
common law, the dissent would shield it from § 9 liability, even though the
words "kill" and "harm" in the statutory definition could apply to such deliberate
conduct. We cannot accept that limitation. In any event, our reasons for
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The opinion logically errs by removing "take" from its modem context
within the ESA and reading it in light of Nineteenth Century common law
regulations on hunting. If traditional common law is the subject of the
inquiry, "take" is properly limited in this respect. However, under modem
law, the definition, like the subject matter defined, must remain dynamic,
and be interpreted in the context of the statute in which it appears.
Instead, the dissent read "take" in an outdated manner typified by the
sources relied on for its position. A 1949 dictionary and a series of hunting
regulations and cases offer the only support cited for this position.452 The
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar
Bears, and even the Marine Mammal Protection Act, relied on by the circuit
court-these are all programs geared specifically toward prohibiting the
hunting of particular species. None of these provisions share the ESA's
comprehensive focus toward wildlife and habitat protection, and none attest
to the ESA's very clear goal of recovering extremely depleted populations
of wildlife.453 Consequently, the term "take" means something very
different in the context of these statutes.4 4
452. The dissent has drawn the term's definition from the English common law
definition, and relies on some older sources. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896)
(observing that "all the animals which can be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air,
that is to say, wild animals, belong to those who take them"); 17 OxFORD ENGLISH
DICrIONARY 537 (1989); WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 2331 (2d ed. 1949).
453. The species protected under the Act are signals of much greater ecological concern
which foretell adverse impacts to human populations. On the need for the ESA legislation,
the Report of ihe House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fishery observed:
As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants and animals evolved, and
as we increase the pressure for products that they are in a position to supply
(usually unwillingly) we threaten their-and our own-genetic heritage.
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable....
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interest of
mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations....
Who knows, or who can say, what potential cure for cancer or other
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants which
may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed?... Sheer self-interest impels us
to be cautious.... The institutionalization of that caution lies at the heart of
[the ESA].
H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 154, at 4-5. The value to be realized through recovery of a
signal species is value to the general community, not just for some ideal view of nature.
454. "Take" must be interpreted within the context of the ESA-a comprehensive body
of legislation directed toward halting the growing trend toward extinction in a holistic
1996]
79
Plante and Baumann: Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon: P
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
Obviously, the dissent concurred with the Chapter's use of the nocitur
a sociis principle in reading "harm" linking it to the other nine descriptive
terms in the statute.455  He rejected the majority's conclusion that the
circuit court erred in applying nocitur a sociis in a manner depriving "harm"
of any independent meaning. Under this reasoning the dissent pointed to the
terms "trap" and "capture" as two arguably superfluous terms.
45 6
"Harm" would, therefore, still add something even under this narrow
definition. Poisoning an animal, spraying it with chemicals, or destroying
its habitat to get at it, while not necessarily wounding or killing, would
nevertheless "harm" the animal in the narrow sense defined by the
dissent.457
Justice Scalia also found this interpretation supported by the ESA's
penalty provisions. Section 11 of the Act prohibits "knowingly" committed
violations of section 9.458 Yet, "harm" as defined by the Secretary would
subject numerous routine private activities to strict liability when they
manner. The problems to be corrected by the statutes cited by the dissent simply do not
correlate with the findings of Congress in enacting the ESA:
The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have
been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development
untempered by adequate.concern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted in
numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of aesthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its
people;
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(a)(I)-(3), 87 Stat. at 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)).
455. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2424.
456. Id. The majority's reasoning would require the redefinition of these terms to avoid
the surplusage rule relied upon in upholding the "harm" regulation: "If it were true, we
ought to give the word 'trap' in the definition its rare meaning of 'to clothe' (whence
'trappings')-since otherwise it adds nothing to the word 'capture."' Id. However, this
analogy is not entirely consistent with the dictionary definitions of these terms. Contrary to
Justice Scalia's reading, "trap" does have a distinct meaning from capture. Webster's defines
the verb "trap" as "to catch in or take in as if in a trap; to provide or set (a place) with
traps." WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1234 (1981). The word also is defined
as a synonym for "snare, entrap, ensnare, bag, lure," and "decoy." THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY 727 (1974); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1293 (rev. ed.
1982) (defining "trepan," as "to trap; ensnare"). However, the verb "capture" is defined to
encompass the seizure of something by force or trickery, to take captive. THE MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY 116 (1974).
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"fortuitously" injure or kill protected wildlife, regardless of how remote the
chain of causation. 59 This, Justice Scalia concludes, could not have been
Congress' intent. A "knowing" violation requires that the defendant "know
the facts that make the conduct illegal." '  Under the Secretary's interpre-
tation, a "taking" has occurred regardless of whether or not injury to the
protected animal was foreseeable or anticipated. Under the Act, actual
injury to the animal is the fact that makes the conduct illegal. The
regulation, however, only requires that the conduct be the cause-in-fact of
the injury or death.46' No element of foreseeability has been explicitly
required.462 Therefore, the dissent, like Justice O'Connor, has attempted
to inject some notion of tort law into the ESA, only to wonder aloud why
the concept failed to fit comfortably in the legislative scheme.
Justice Scalia insisted that the Secretary's interpretation runs counter to
the general structure of the ESA.4 6' First, he pointed to the explicit
reference to habitat modification in section 7(a)(2), which prohibits the
adverse modification of critical habitat by federal agencies.4 6 "Critical
habitat" is defined in section 3.46 In spite of the explicit prohibition of
critical habitat modification in section 7, the dissent observed that Congress
remained silent on the issue of habitat in section 9. Congress' decision to
include habitat modification in one instance, while not mentioning it in
another must, the dissent argues, be presumed intentional and purpose-
ful.466 Thus, Justice Scalia found it odd that Congress would carefully
define "critical habitat" explicitly prohibiting its destruction or adverse
modification in section 7, while leaving the Secretary free to evaluate
adverse habitat modification under the guise of "harm" in section 9.467
Justice Scalia questioned the majority's attempt to divide these provisions
into two discrete regulatory realms based on section 7's limited applicability
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. See supra note 416.
462. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2424.
463. Id. at 2425.
464. Id.
465. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 2(2), (7), 92 Stat. at 3751 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1532(5)).
466. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2425 (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2035 (1993) ("'Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another . . . .it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
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to federal agencies.4 6' Relying solely on the broad definition of "persons,"
to whom section 9 is directed, Justice Scalia concludes that section 7's
prohibition against adverse modification of critical habitat has been rendered
superfluous by the Secretary's interpretation of section 9.469 This conten-
tion was rejected by the majority which held such overlap between sections
7 and 9 reflective of the comprehensive regulatory scheme erected under the
ESA.470
The remainder of the dissent focused on each of the four bases
supporting the majority's decision to uphold the regulation, attempting to
reject each in turn.47 The dissent points to previous holdings by this
Court, in denouncing the "simplistic assumption that whatever furthers the
statute's primary objective must be the law. 472 The ends reached by the
Secretary's regulation could not, therefore, per se justify the means
selected.473 However, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, adherence to
this rule cannot, by the same logic, counsel a reading that is counterproduc-
tive to the statute's overall purposes. 474
468. Justice Scalia concluded that "[i]n fact however, [§§ 7 and 9] do not operate in
separate realms; federal agencies are subject to both, because 'person[s]' forbidden to take
protected species under [§ 9] include agencies and departments of the Federal Government."
Id. at 2426.
469. However, this sense of overlap among various provisions of the ESA offered no
problem for the Court in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The project
was held to violate § 7's prohibitions. Id. at 185 n.30. The Court noted that the project
would probably constitute a § 9 "taking" as well. Id.
470. See supra Part IV.E.
471. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2426.
472. On this point Justice Scalia declared, "I thought we had renounced the vice of
'simplistically ... assum[ing] that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be
the law."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526
(1987)).
473. Id.
474. The dissent's means/ends analysis is weakened by consideration of the Chevron
doctrine. The Secretary is given considerable discretion to construe and administer the ESA.
Chevron dictates that this discretion be given great deference to by courts reviewing the
Secretary's decisions. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). However, the Secretary's interpretation must advance the purposes
of the Act, and no amount of deference accorded to the Secretary's reading will save an








The immediate impact of the Sweet Home V decision was to restore the
Palila cases and dissolve the split between the federal circuits. Since the
case was a facial attack on the Secretary's "harm" regulation, the actual
holding in Sweet Home V is not as significant as other aspects of the
opinion. While the facial attack on this regulation was rejected, an
amendment to the ESA deleting the term "harm" from the statutory
definition of "take," or repeal of or significant amendment to the "harm"
regulation it upholds, would nullify the decision.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion provides some insights as to
where this area of the law may be headed. While upholding the regulation
on its face, Justice O'Connor is one of at least four Supreme Court Justices
who believe that Palila was wrongly decided. Her arguments regarding the
regulation's causation requirement and its alleged focus on individual
animals are best suited to legal challenges to specific applications of the
regulation, and not facial attacks on the regulation itself. Indeed, she recog-
nizes this point and cautions that such challenges must have well developed
factual records to withstand scrutiny in accordance with the Sweet Home V
decision.
The true impact of Sweet Home V lies as much in what was not settled
by the court. The case demonstrates the soundness of the Chevron doctrine
as a standard of review. The properly-exercised discretion of the Secretary
ought to be upheld unless a clear incongruity with the Act can be distilled.
In the instant case, the Secretary's decision reflected a proper understanding
for the ESA and its comprehensive purposes. To conclude that a species
cannot be "harmed" by destroying its habitat, leaving it inadequate shelter
and food, defies common sense. Congress recognized this in enacting the
ESA generally, and section 9 in particular. The Secretary recognized this
too. Therefore, the Chevron doctrine emerges as an important mechanism
for ensuring that our national environmental policy is administered in a
rational manner and in the way expected by Congress. The remaining
controversy over species recovery will diminish only when the raison d'etre
of the ESA is fulfilled.
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